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Refocusing Abortion Jurisprudence to Include the
Woman: A Response to Bopp and Coleson and
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
Barbara J. Cox*
James Bopp, Jr. and Richard E. Coleson condemn Roe v.
Wade1 and its progeny in their article entitled The Right to Abor-
tion: Anomalous, Absolute, and Ripe for Reversal.2 They make
their case against a woman's constitutional right to choose an abor-
tion by focusing exclusively on the state's and the fetus' interests.
Unfortunately, one interest is missing: that of the pregnant wo-
man. In 174 pages, Bopp and Coleson include only a handful of
references to the impact that the availability of legalized abortion
has on a pregnant woman.
Bopp and Coleson are not alone in excluding women from the
abortion debate.3 In the United States Supreme Court's recent de-
cision of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,4 the plurality
also excludes women from the focus of the case. This exclusion of
women from the abortion debate disembodies the right recognized
in Roe and the original reason for Roe's existence. Roe recognized
the debilitating impact that state imposed pregnancy has on a wo-
man's constitutional right to liberty and privacy.5
This Article seeks to refocus the abortion debate to include
the impact of unwanted pregnancy on women. As Rosalind Pollack
Petchesky noted:
* Associate Professor, California Western School of Law, B.A., Michigan State Univer-
sity, 1978; J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1982. The author wishes to thank her research
assistants, Alicia Baskette, June Stein, and Tracy Macuga for the incredible help they pro-
vided on this article: it would not have been possible without them. She would also like to
thank Jean Cox for helping to clarify her thoughts on this issue; Michal Belknap for his
comments on an earlier draft; Mary Ellen Norvell, Sue Patmor and Frank Daniels for their
technical assistance and guidance, and Mollie Martinek for her editing assistance and unwa-
vering support.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 3 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 181 (1989)[hereinafter Bopp & Coleson].
3. See, e.g., Loewy, Observation: Why Roe v. Wade Should Be Overruled, 67 N.C.L.
REV. 939 (1989) (discussion excludes impact of pregnancy on women and effects of unwanted
pregnancy).
4. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
5. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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In this political and cultural context, the immediate priority be-
comes to restore women to a central place in the pregnancy scene.
To do this, we must create new images that recontextualize the fe-
tus: that place it back into the uterus, and the uterus back into the
woman's body, and her body back into its social space--differenti-
ated by age, class, race and physical circumstance.'
The first two sections of this Article challenge Bopp and
Coleson's argument that a woman's right to choose an abortion en-
joys no constitutional basis and that Roe should be reversed. A wo-
man's constitutionally protected liberty and privacy rights are di-
rectly implicated by the state imposed pregnancy that results from
restricted access to abortion. The third section disputes Bopp and
Coleson's claim that the abortion right has become virtually invio-
late, not subject to the state restrictions that the Court has allowed
for other aspects of the privacy right. This Article challenges
Bopp and Coleson's reading of the abortion precedents and argues
that the right to choose an abortion has been subject to continuous
narrowing since the time it was announced in Roe. As Justice
Blackmun noted in his recent dissent in Webster:
Today, Roe v. Wade and the fundamental constitutional right of
women to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, survive but are
not secure .... I fear for the future. I fear for the liberty and
equality of millions of women who have lived and come of age in the
16 years since Roe was decided.8
Finally, the fourth section of this Article challenges Bopp and
Coleson's argument that both criminal and tort law recognize and
protect the fetus and that abortion law diverges from this protec-
tion. This Article concludes that the abortion cases have correctly
differentiated between fetuses who are dependent on the women
6. Petchesky, Introduction to Amicus Brief: Richard Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 3, 6 (1986).
7. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 222-34.
8. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3067 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). Blackmun noted that:
Although the Court extricates itself from this case without making a single, even in-
cremental, change in the law of abortion, the plurality and Justice Scalia would over-
rule Roe (the first silently, the other explicitly) and would return to the States virtu-
ally unfettered authority to control the quintessentially intimate, personal, and life-
directing decision whether to carry a fetus to term.
Id. He concluded his dissent with the following statement: "For today, at least, the law of
abortion stands undisturbed. For today, the women of this Nation still retain the liberty to
control their destinies. But the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows."
Id. at 3079.
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who bear them and those who are capable of surviving outside the
womb. Roe is not out-of-step with other areas of the law in this
regard. In fact, it is consistent.'
When the abortion debate is framed to include the interests of
women, 10 it becomes clear that Roe correctly recognized a woman's
constitutional liberty and privacy rights to make the abortion
decision.
I. EXCLUSION OF WOMEN FROM THE ABORTION DISCUSSION
Bopp and Coleson's virtual disregard for the impact of un-
wanted pregnancy on women who cannot obtain legal abortions is
very troublesome. It is a critical omission. Bopp and Coleson are
only able to pursue their argument by excluding women's interests
from their analysis. Their Article begins with a survey of early cri-
tiques of Roe that were concerned with the personhood of the fe-
tus.11 The authors of these early critiques feared that, due to Roe's
"loose language and lack of constitutional roots," the decision
would lead to infanticide and euthanasia.1 2 Bopp and Coleson's
discussion of future harm, however, excludes any reference to the
future harm to women who are prohibited from legal access to
abortion.13 That exclusion permits them to argue that Roe was in-
correctly decided because they examine only one aspect of the
problem: potential harm to the fetus.
9. Bopp and Coleson also discuss certain aspects of medical regulations. See Bopp &
Coleson, supra note 2, at 283-98. They also discuss certain procedural and adjudicatory is-
sues. See id. at 299-351. I have chosen not to respond to these issues, not because I agree
with their views, but due to length limitations.
10. This is not to maintain that the state's interests in protecting maternal health,
maintaining medical standards and protecting potential human life are not also important.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). Countless others have fulfilled the need to con-
centrate on the state's interests. Unlike many articles, this Article does not discuss "fetal
rights." Cf. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 246-83 (discussing fetal rights). This is be-
cause the Supreme Court has considered, and rejected, the argument that "person" in the
fourteenth amendment includes fetuses. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-62.
11. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 185.
12. Id.
13. Illegal abortions in the 1960's numbered between 200,000 and 1,200,000 per year.
Twenty percent of all deaths attributed to pregnancy and childbirth resulted from illegal
abortions. See Paltrow, Amicus Brief: Richard Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 3, 14 (1986). In Mexico, where abortion is
illegal except in rare cases, at least 75,000 women per year die because of illegal or self-
induced abortions. These numbers are based on official figures from the Mexican Social
Security Institute and other sources. See McDonnell, Pro-Choice Drive Expands Across the
Border, L.A. Times, Nov. 17, 1989, at B1, col. 6; see also E. MESSER & K. MAY, BACK RooMs:
VOICES FROM THE ILLEGAL ABORTION ERA (1988) (oral histories of women who had abortions
when it was illegal).
UTAH LAW REVIEW
Bopp and Coleson also argue that "[t]he Court has never
demonstrated the connection between the Constitution and the
Court-created right to choose abortion. ' 14 They dismiss the idea
that the right to choose is protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment's prohibition against depriving anyone of liberty or privacy
without due process.15
They continue to exclude women from their analysis by focus-
ing on Roe as a case protecting the medical profession. "Roe ...
appear[s] result-oriented, unjustified by the Constitution, and
designed to protect a certain profession, rather than all interested
parties."' 6 To envision Roe merely as a physician's protection
package, a claim they make throughout their article, 7 is to show
callous disregard of the positive impact that Roe has had on the
significant number of American women facing unwanted pregnancy
every year.' Bopp and Coleson fixate on fetal rights and physi-
cians' rights and fail to recognize that Roe has significantly im-
pacted women facing unwanted pregnancies.
Bopp and Coleson also criticize the Court's decision in Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists",
for stare decisis abuse.20 They claim Thornburgh ignored Roe's rec-
ognition of the states' compelling interest in maternal health dur-
ing the second trimester and in fetal life after viability.2' They ar-
gue that "[s]tare decisis would require continued recognition of
those interests and sympathetic treatment of regulations seeking
14. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 200.
15. See id.; notes 46-54 infra and accompanying text.
16. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 198. It is true that Justice Blackmun's decision
in Roe substantially protects doctors, as can be seen in his statement that "the attending
physician, in consultation with his [or her] patient, is free to determine, without regulation
by the State, that, in his [or her] medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be ter-
minated." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
17. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 198-200.
18. Paltrow estimated, as of 1986, that approximately 1.5 million American women
choose to have abortions each year. See Paltrow, supra note 13, at 13. That number has
remained virtually constant. In 1988, 1,590,750 abortions were performed.
19. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
20. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 214-18.
21. See id. at 214. Thornburgh entailed a challenge to the Pennsylvania Abortion Con-
trol Act of 1982, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3201-20 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1989). The Act con-
tained numerous restrictions "seemingly designed to prevent a woman, with the advice of
her physician, from exercising her freedom of choice." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759. The
Court found the restrictions to be unconstitutional attempts, "under the guise of protecting
maternal health or potential life, to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies." Id. Ac-
cording to the Court, "[c]lose analysis of those provisions ... shows that they wholly
subordinate constitutional privacy interests and concerns with maternal health in an effort
to deter a woman from making a decision that, with her physician, is hers to make." Id.
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to implement them. The Court has not done this. Rather, the
Court has struck down virtually every legislative attempt to assert
these 'compelling' interests."22
When Bopp and Coleson detail the compelling interests that
should be recognized, they are concerned only with the "sympa-
thetic" treatment of the states' interests. They are unconcerned
with the "sympathetic" treatment of a woman's right to choose to
have an abortion, a right that the Supreme Court has recognized
repeatedly for over seventeen years.2" They fail to acknowledge the
impact that such sympathetic treatment of states' interests would
have on women's interests. Their sympathy extends only to states'
attempts to narrow a woman's right to choose to have an abortion.
Relying on Jacobson v. Massachusetts,24 a compulsory vacci-
nation case, Bopp and Coleson argue that a state should be able to
protect the fetus "even at the risk of some increase in danger to
the woman."2 5 They use the Jacobson reasoning to justify Pennsyl-
vania's attempt in Thornburgh to enact a requirement that doctors
use the abortion technique that most likely will preserve the life of
the fetus unless that method causes a" 'significantly greater medi-
cal risk' to the mother."26
In Jacobson, the risk imposed, while partially to protect soci-
ety at large, was also imposed for the health of the person vacci-
nated.2 7 Comparing the risk from receiving a compulsory vaccina-
tion that was "too small to be seriously weighed" '28 with using the
abortion technique that will best protect the fetus even though
causing a "significantly greater" risk to the woman's health demon-
strates an incredible lack of concern for the life and health of the
woman involved.
In Thornburgh, an increased risk to the woman's health was
mandated even though it would not improve her physical well-be-
ing. The State required that a woman protect the fetus, a fetus
that she had chosen not to continue to bear, even though that pro-
tection increased risks to her health. These cases are inapposite; by
their use of this analogy, Bopp and Coleson demonstrate their dis-
regard for the impact that state attempts to restrict abortion have
22. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 214 (emphasis added).
23. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
24. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
25. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 224.
26. Id. (emphasis added)(footnote omitted).
27. See id.
28. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24.
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on a woman's health and life. In fact, this argument exposes them
to the same claims of stare decisis abuse that they raise against the
Court.
Midway through their article, Bopp and Coleson briefly recog-
nize the hardship caused to women by state imposed pregnancy.2"
"Of course, some women refused abortions experience hardship
during pregnancy and childbirth."30 But their recognition is imme-
diately negated when they again turn their attention to the fetus,
which they consider to be at the forefront of the abortion contro-
versy: "But abortion certainly involves a serious intrusion on the
bodily integrity of the fetus, which is arguably greater than the
hardships on its mother."'" They conclude, without further reason-
ing, that the fetus' rights require more concern: "Again, it seems
that the presence of the fetus complicates the traditional privacy
rights paradigm so as to justify greater state monitoring of the
abortion right."3'
The abortion controversy poses extremely difficult questions
because of the conflict between the state's interest in protecting
potential life and a woman's interest in retaining her constitutional
liberty and privacy rights. Reconciliation of these conflicting inter-
ests cannot be obtained by excluding women's interests from con-
sideration, and focusing only on the fetus or the state, as do Bopp
and Coleson. Reconciliation will only be achieved by recognizing
the different, and sometimes conflicting, interests involved. These
interests must be balanced to reach a result consistent with the
requirements of the Constitution. That is what the Court did in
Roe.
Bopp and Coleson's continuous silence on the impact of re-
strictive abortion laws on pregnant women is fundamental to their
Article. Bopp and Coleson are not alone in their silence. Unfortu-
nately, the plurality decision in Webster, also omitted women's in-
terests from their consideration." This decision is particularly no-
table for "its intended evisceration of precedents and its deafening
silence about the constitutional protections [of a woman to choose




33. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3073 (1989) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun states: "Of the aspirations and settled understand-
ings of American women, of the inevitable and brutal consequences of what it is doing, the
tough-approach plurality utters not a word. This silence is callous." Id.
548 [1990: 543
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to have an abortion] that it would jettison."34 In Webster, the
Court upheld sections of a Missouri statute that stated: "[t]he life
of each human being begins at conception;" 35 "[u]nborn children
have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being;"" "[i]t
shall be unlawful for any public employee within the scope of his
[or her] employment to perform or assist an abortion, not neces-
sary to save the life of the mother; 3 7 it is "unlawful for any public
facility to be used for the purpose of performing or assisting an
abortion not necessary to save the life of the mother."38
By upholding each of these provisions as constitutional, the
plurality essentially excluded from its analysis the woman and her
constitutionally protected right to choose an abortion. The plural-
ity denied the existence of a fundamental constitutional right to
choose an abortion, despite seventeen years of precedent explicitly
finding such a right. 9 Instead, the plurality claimed that a wo-
man's right to an abortion is a "liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause" and that Missouri's purpose in preventing
abortions on viable fetuses was legitimate.40 Although Justice
Rehnquist did not state this explicitly, his use of "legitimate" as
the standard against which Missouri's interest was to be reviewed
shows his belief that this liberty interest is not fundamental.4'
34. Id. at 3067.
35. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205.1(1) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
36. Id. § 1.205.1(2) (1986 & Vernon Supp. 1990).
37. Id. § 188.210 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
38. Id. § 188.215.
39. In his dissent in Webster, Justice Blackmun refers to the numerous cases in which
the Court "repeatedly and consistently has accepted and applied the basic principle that a
woman has a fundamental right to make the highly personal choice whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy." Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3078, n.12
(1989)(Blackmun, J., dissenting). These include: Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (1979); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); and Thornburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
40. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058. The Webster plurality distinguished this "liberty in-
terest" from Akron, in which the majority accepted that a woman has a fundamental right
to make the choice whether to terminate her pregnancy. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 420 n.1. The
plurality also distinguished a woman's liberty interest from Justice Blackmun's statemerit in
his Webster dissent that Roe found a "limited fundamental constitutional right." Webster,
109 S. Ct. at 3076 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, noted that the plurality's test "appears to be
nothing more than a dressed-up version of rational-basis review, this Court's most lenient
level of scrutiny." He noted further: "The [Court's] standard completely disregards the irre-
ducible minimum of Roe: the Court's recognition that a woman has a limited fundamental
constitutional right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy." Id. at 3076.
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Under his analysis, abortion laws such as Missouri's could restrict
the pregnant woman's right to choose an abortion so long as the
laws were rationally related to a legitimate government goal.42
Such minimal scrutiny of restrictive state abortion laws would re-
sult in all abortion laws being upheld, thereby effectively overrul-
ing Roe.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia went even further
than Justice Rehnquist. He stated that the question whether a
state can enact restrictive abortion statutes is "political and not
juridical."43 If adopted, his position would eliminate constitutional
protections of a woman's right to choose to have an abortion and
would leave the matter to the vicissitudes of the political mo-
ment.44 Such a move would symbolize a dramatic retreat from the
42. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.6, at 323 (3d
ed. 1986) (discussing various levels of constitutional scrutiny relating to nonfundamental
rights).
43. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Justice Scalia thus exposes his belief that women have no constitutional right to
choose an abortion. In his view, whether a woman can obtain an abortion is a question that
should be left to the political process. Justice Scalia's position would remove women's rela-
tive security in the knowledge that, at least during the first trimester, their right to choose is
protected, placing them in the untenable position of having their liberty and privacy altered
with the political winds.
The inherent instability of those winds is evident from the political turmoil surrounding
abortion during the fall of 1989. In Pennsylvania, the legislature passed a law prohibiting
abortions after 24 weeks, requiring women to be informed about the risk of abortion and
imposing a 24-hour waiting period before abortions. See 18 PA. CONS. STATS. § 3205 (Purdon
1989). In Florida, the legislature refused to pass legislation that would have severely re-
stricted abortion. TIME, Nov. G, 1989 at 30. On September 26th, the United States Senate
passed H.R. 2990 which expanded Medicaid funding for abortion. H.R. 2990, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 11,848-01 (1989). Medicaid funding had been cut off on a federal
level after Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), which upheld the Hyde Amendment elimi-
nating federal Medicaid funding for abortion. H.R. 2990 covered funding for abortions of
women who were the victims of rape, incest, or ectopic pregnancy. A.C.L.U. Reproductive
Rights Update, Vol I. No. 6 p. 2 (Sept. 29, 1989)[hereinafter A.C.L.U.]. On October 21,
1989, President George Bush vetoed the bill and an attempt to override the veto failed. See
Rosenblatt, Bush Vetoes Aid Bill: Abortion Funding Cited, L.A. Times, Nov. 20, 1989, at
Al, col. 6. President Bush also vetoed an appropriations bill for the District of Columbia
because it allowed the district government to use locally raised money to fund abortions.
See id. President Bush vetoed a $14.6 billion foreign aid bill because of a $15 million grant
to a United Nations family practice agency that provides money to China's population con-
trol agency which supports abortion. See id. In July 1989, California Governor George
Deukmejian cut $24.1 million from the state budget for family planning clinics. See id. The
result of these repeated attempts to restrict the right to choose abortion has also been felt in
political races. Abortion was the chief issue in the Virginia and New Jersey election in 1989,
and the victor in each race was the Democratic candidate who supported abortion rights.
Lauter, President Seeks to Downplay Abortion Issue, L.A. Times, Nov. 8, 1989, at Al, col.
3.
44. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3077 n.11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun
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Court's previous recognition of the impact that unwanted preg-
nancy has on the liberty and privacy interests of women. -
Justice Scalia's brief statement that "[p]erhaps . . . abortions
cannot constitutionally be proscribed," 5 is the closest he comes to
acknowledging that the conflict created by restrictive state statutes
might raise a constitutional question. Beyond this, he did not elab-
orate. Justice Scalia avoided any recognition that the right to
choose an abortion has a drastic impact on the woman's inter-
ests-interests presumably protected by the Constitution.
To avoid exclusion of constitutionally protected rights from
the jurisprudence of abortion, the issue must be reframed to in-
clude the woman's interests. The next Section details the constitu-
tional protections that guarantee a woman's right to choose, focus-
ing on the impact that unwanted pregnancy has on a woman's life
and identity.
II. PREGNANCY'S IMPACT ON WOMEN'S LIBERTY AND PRIVACY
Bopp and Coleson condemn Roe for finding that a woman's
constitutional right to privacy includes the right to choose to have
an abortion." They do not believe that the right to privacy, the
validity of which they question, supports the right of a woman to
choose an abortion.47
This section argues that the liberty interest protected by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment4 s is one source by
which the freedom to make fundamental choices about one's life
and identity, including the right to choose an abortion, is protected
stated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissi-
tudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and offi-
cials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the Courts. One's right
to life, liberty, and property ... may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no election.' In a Nation that cherishes liberty, the ability of a woman to
control the biological operation of her body and to determine with her, responsible
physician whether or not to carry a fetus to term, must fall within that limited sphere
of individual autonomy that lies beyond the will or the power of any transient
majority.
Id. (citation omitted).
45. Id. at 3066 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Scalia goes on to note "[t]hat [it] is surely an arguable question, the question that reconsid-
eration of Roe v. Wade entails." Id.
46. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 221.
47. See id.
48. "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
No. 3]
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under the Constitution. The right to make fundamental choices is
implicit in the "concept of ordered liberty"4 and thus is protected
against intrusion by the state,50 except as needed to "promote a
compelling secular state interest."'51 This Section also addresses
the right of privacy and demonstrates that a woman's right to
choose whether to bear a child, including her right to choose an
abortion, must be protected as fundamental if the constitutional
protection of privacy is to have significant force. This Section con-
cludes that Bopp and Coleson are seriously mistaken in their re-
peated claims that the right to choose an abortion falls outside the
rule of law,52 that it amounts to stare decisis abuse,53 and that no
source for the right to choose an abortion exists in the
Constitution.5 4
49. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
50. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
51. Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amend-
ment Right about to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Four-
teenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?, XVII N.Y.L.F. 335, 376 (1971). "The legitimacy of
secular legislation depends. . . on whether the State can advance some justification for its
law beyond its conformity to religious doctrine." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211
(1986).
52. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 192-201.
53. See id. at 192-210.
54. See id. at 355. Additionally, scholars have raised the question whether the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment protects women from restrictive abortion
laws that are "part of the systematic oppression and devaluation of women." Olsen, Unrav-
eling Compromises, 103 HARV. L. REv. 105, 120 (1989). For a further discussion of this issue,
see id. at 117-26 and articles cited therein.
Besides the substantive due process analysis that focuses on liberty and privacy rights,
and the equal protection analysis that focuses on equality, an additional constitutional
source for protecting a woman's right to choose an abortion is found in the ninth amend-
ment to the Constitution. The ninth amendment states: "The enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." U.S. CONsT. amend. IX. The ninth amendment indicates that individual rights not
explicitly recognized in the Bill of Rights are constitutionally protected even though they
were not enumerated in the previous eight amendments. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 492 (1965)(Goldberg, J., concurring). The list of rights included in the Bill of
Rights is not by any means exhaustiqe. See id. Thus, Bopp and Coleson's claim that the
right to choose abortion is undeserving of constitutional protection and that in Roe Justice
Blackmun went beyond the rule of law and stare decisis is directly contradicted by the ninth
amendment. In fact, the trial court in Roe found that the right to privacy was based on the
ninth amendment's reservation of unenumerated rights in the people. See Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
David A. J. Richards has painstakingly detailed the constitutional history surrounding
the "anti-federalists" opposition to the 1787 Constitution. See Richards, Constitutional Le-
gitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 800 (1986). The anti-federalists'
primary complaint about the document was that it lacked a Bill of Rights. See id. at 839.
The federalists responded that any powers not expressly granted to the federal government
were reserved to the people. The federalists believed that expressly listing individual rights
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A. Liberty Includes the Right to Choose to Have an Abortion
A woman's right to choose whether to have an abortion is not
only included in the right of privacy,55 it is also protected by the
fourteenth amendment which provides that no person can be de-
prived of liberty without due process of law. To determine what is
a constitutionally protected liberty interest, the Court has looked
to "'principle[s] of justice so rooted in the tradition and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental' and thus
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' or . 'basic in our sys-
tem of jurisprudence.' "156
A woman's right to choose to have an abortion is included
within these principles of justice that are protected as fundamen-
tal. Without the liberty to choose, the state has the power to re-
quire that a pregnancy, once begun, must continue. Such a require-
ment amounts to state-imposed pregnancy, an imposition of such
magnitude as to be antithetical to the constitutional protection of
individual liberty. As Justice Stevens stated in his dissent in
Meachum v. Fano:57
protected by the Constitution would imply that those rights alone were protected, to the
exclusion of others that were unexpressed. See id. at 840. Many states refused to ratify the
document until convinced that a Bill of Rights, including the ninth amendment, would be
added. The ninth amendment explicitly reserved unenumerated rights to the people. See
id.; see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487-90 (Goldberg, J., concurring)(documenting purpose of
ninth amendment as recognizing unenumerated fundamental rights protected by
Constitution).
This history and its focus on the ninth amendment demonstrates that, contrary to
Bopp and Coleson's argument, the Bill of Rights recognizes that not all individual rights are
enumerated. See Richards, supra, at 840. Professor Tribe notes that "[i]t is a common error,
but an error nonetheless, to talk of 'ninth amendment rights.' The ninth amendment is not
a source of rights as such; it is simply a rule of how to read the Constitution." L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-3, at 776 n.14 (2d ed. 1988)(emphasis in original). Sig-
nificantly, the ninth amendment's reservation of unenumerated rights retained by the peo-
ple would include a woman's right to choose an abortion at any stage of her pregnancy, not
the more restricted right that was recognized in Roe. See Means, supra note 51, at 374-75.
See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 135 n.26 (citing Means for proposition that even post-quickening
abortion was never a common-law crime). According to Means, the common law in effect
when the ninth amendment was ratified in 1791 gave women an unfettered liberty to choose
to have an abortion. See Means, supra note 51, at 374. In fact, this right had been protected
since the fourteenth century. See id. at 377. The ninth amendment, by expressly reserving
to the people those rights unenumerated in the Constitution, surely included the right of a
woman to choose to have an abortion. See id.; see also infra notes 97-98 and accompanying
text (supporting this view of history). This is true even if one interprets the ninth amend-
ment as of the date of ratification of the Bill of Rights, and not "connotatively in light of
contemporary circumstances." Richards, supra at 826.
55. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
56. L. TRIE, supra note 54, § 11-2, at 773 (footnotes omitted).
57. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
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[N]either the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States create
the liberty which the Due Process Clause protects . . . Of course,
law is essential to the exercise and enjoyment of individual liberty in
a complex society. But it is not the source of liberty . . . .I had
thought it self-evident that all men5 were endowed by their Creator
with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights. It is that basic
freedom which the Due Process Clause protects."
In Palko v. Connecticut,"° Justice Cardozo analyzed the mean-
ing of the liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment.
He examined the particular individual freedoms protected against
intrusion by the federal government and considered which inter-
ests had been "absorbed" by the fourteenth amendment making
them resistant against intrusion by the states.61 As an organizing
58. Today, these inalienable rights, acknowledged as being self-evidently endowed in
men, also have been constitutionally recognized as endowed in women. See Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976)(same); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)(same); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)(same); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)(equality on the
basis of sex protected by the Constitution).
'Whether liberty is truly granted to women, however, has been questioned:
Inequality because of sex defines and situates women as women. If the sexes were
equal, women would not be sexually subjected. Sexual force would be exceptional,
consent to sex could be commonly real, and sexually violated women would be be-
lieved. If the sexes were equal, women would not be economically subjected, their
desperation and marginality cultivated, their enforced dependency exploited sexually
or economically. Women would have speech, privacy, authority, respect, and more
resources than they have now. Rape and pornography would be recognized as viola-
tions, and abortion would be both rare and actually guaranteed.
In the United States, it is acknowledged that the state is capitalist; it is not ac-
knowledged that it is male. The law of sex equality, constitutional by interpretation
and statutory by joke, erupts through this fissure, exposing the sex equality that the
state purports to guarantee.
C. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 215 (1989). Given this truth, at
least truth as encountered by countless women, it may seem questionable to-proceed with an
analysis that a woman's right to choose an abortion is protected under the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause. But this feeling of unease is overcome when one returns to
the purpose of this Article: to expose the invalidity of Bopp and Coleson's views of abortion.
Regardless whether sexual equality exists in any form in the United States, it is unquestion-
able that the basis for pursuing that equality is provided in the Constitution. From such a
foundational assumption, this Article argues that women have a liberty interest in being free
to choose an abortion.
59. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 230. Accord L. TRIBE, supra note 54, § 15-3, at 1312.
60. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
61. See id. at 323-28. Justice Cardozo was trying to decide which Bill of Rights provi-
sions to "incorporate" in defining the meaning of the liberty interest protected by the four-
teenth amendment. See L. TRIBE, supra note 54, § 11-2, at 772-73. Justice Black argued that
the Bill of Rights set an outer boundary on the substantive reach of the fourteenth amend-
ment. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69-72, 77-78, 83-85, 89-90 (1947)(Black, J.,
dissenting). The ninth amendment, however, "states a rule of construction pointing away
from [this] reverse incorporation view that only the interests secured by the Bill of Rights
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principle, he found that those freedoms, which are "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty," are protected against state infringe-
ment by way of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.2
He excluded the right to trial by jurye3 and the immunity from
prosecution except by indictment as "not of the very essence" of
ordered liberty.14 Abolishing those rights would not violate a "prin-
ciple of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental."'65 Justice Cardozo further
noted that the freedoms absorbed by the fourteenth amendment
were those that, if sacrificed, would result in the demise of liberty
and justice.66 He concluded that:
[The] domain of liberty, withdrawn by the Fourteenth Amendment
from encroachment by the states, has been enlarged by latter-day
judgments to include liberty of the mind as well as liberty of action
[L]iberty is something more than exemption from physical re-
straint, and that even in the field of substantive rights and duties
the legislative judgment, if oppressive and arbitrary, may be overrid-
den by the courts.6 7
Justice Cardozo ended his opinion in Palko by asking whether de-
struction of the interest at stake would violate those "fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions?"" Although the Court answered "no" in
Palko as to the protection against double jeopardy by the states,"
are encompassed within the 14th amendment, and at most provides a positive source of law
for fundamental but unmentioned rights." L. TRmE, supra note 54, § 11-3, at 774-75.
62. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg argued that:
[T]he Ninth amendment, in indicating that not all such liberties are specifically men-
tioned in the first eight amendments, is surely relevant in showing the existence of
other fundamental personal rights, now protected from state, as well as federal, in-
fringement. In sum, the Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support to the view
that the 'liberty' protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from infringe-
ment by the Federal Government or the States is not restricted to rights specifically
mentioned in the first eight amendments.
Id.
63. See Palko, 302 U.S. at 324. However, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968),
the Court held that the right to a jury trial in a criminal case was incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment.
64. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
65. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
66. See id. at 326.
67. Id. at 327 (footnote omitted).
68. Id. at 328 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
69. See id. But see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)(incorporating double




a resounding "yes" must follow this question when applied to the
liberty interest at stake in a woman's right to choose whether to
have an abortion.
Bopp and Coleson, while discussing whether the right to an
abortion is inherent in the right to privacy,7 0 assert that the right
to abortion is not "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental."'71 They reach this conclu-
sion by referring to the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-cen-
tury abortion law,72 and they repeat Justice White's claim from
Thornburgh that "'a free, egalitarian, and democratic society does
not presuppose any particular rule or set of rules with respect to
abortion.' ,73 Thus, they conclude that the right to have an abor-
tion is not fundamental and can be restricted by the states merely
upon showing a rational relationship between a legitimate state in-
terest and the abortion statute in question.74
Bopp and Coleson also challenge the validity of the Palko for-
mulation of when state statutes impinge on the liberty interest
protected by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.
Rather than using a formulation as "abstract" as the one in
Palko,"6 they claim that the Roe court should have used the formu-
lation from Duncan v. Louisiana.7 In Duncan, the Court stated
that whether the due process clause protects a particular liberty
interest is determined by "whether given this kind of [common-
law] system a particular procedure is fundamental-whether, that
is, a procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of or-
dered liberty. '78 Although they concede that Duncan was not ex-
pressly extended to due process analysis until Moore v. East Cleve-
land,70 they refer to Palko's "'questionable contemporary vitality'
70. Bopp and Coleson do not discuss whether the liberty interest protected by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, aside from its privacy component, protects a
woman's right to choose to have an abortion. The analysis of the privacy right is the same
analysis used when discussing any substantive challenge under the due process clause.
Therefore, I refer to Bopp and Colson's analysis of the right to privacy in this section.
71. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 236 n.410 (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325).
72. See id. at 238-40.
73. Id. at 236 n.410 (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics & Gyne-
cology, 476 U.S. 747, 793 (1986)(White, J., dissenting)).
74. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
75. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 237.
76. Id. at 237 n.413 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 n.12 (1977),
which noted the "abstract formula" of Palko and the more restrictive, historically based test
of Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)).
77. See id.
78. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149-50 n.14.
79. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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when Roe was decided." 80
Regardless whether one uses the Palko test or the Duncan
test, it is evident that Bopp and Coleson entirely miss the point in
analyzing the liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause. Whether the right to have an abortion
is rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people may be
open to question. The right to choose to have an abortion, how-
ever, is fundamentally rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people. When the focus is placed on the choice whether to have
an abortion, due process protection for the liberty to make that
choice is found easily.
In this way, Carey v. Population Services Internationall fo-
cused on the choice involved, not the particular practice. The Ca-
rey Court declared a New York statute"2 unconstitutional for
criminalizing the sale of contraceptives by anyone but licensed
pharmacists.83 The appellants argued that the Court had not ac-
corded fundamental status to the right of access to contraceptives,
and thus the state had the power to limit or prohibit the distribu-
tion of contraceptives. 4 The Court noted that this argument was
fatally flawed because it "overlooks the underlying premise . . .
that the Constitution protects 'the right of the individual . . . to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into. . . the de-
cision whether to bear or beget a child.' "85
The Court stated that the same test must be applied when
considering state regulations burdening the individual's "right to
decide to prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by substan-
tially limiting access to the means of effectuating that decision as
is applied to state statutes that prohibit the decision entirely. 8 6
Such regulations must serve compelling state interests and must be
drawn narrowly to effect only those legitimate state interests.8 "
The Court explained:
80. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 237 (citing Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 931 n.79 (1973)).
81. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
82. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6811(8) (McKinney 1985).
83. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 681-82. The Court concentrated on the privacy aspect of
the liberty protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as the basis for
this determination. See id. at 684. The analysis used by the Court is the same when consid-
ering the liberty interest per se.
84. See id. at 686-87.
85. Id. at 687 (emphasis added)(citation omitted).




This is so not because there is an independent fundamental 'right of
access to contraceptives,' but because such access is essential to ex-
ercise of the constitutionally protected right of decision in matters
of childbearing that is the underlying foundation of the holdings in
Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade.8
Thus, Justice White, and Bopp and Coleson are incorrect in focus-
ing on whether under the Anglo-American regime a particular rule
or set of rules had been established regarding abortion. The correct
focus is on the decision to be made. That decision is protected
from state regulation by the due process clause because it is funda-
mental to preserving liberty for pregnant women.
Furthermore, even if we apply the Duncan formula of concen-
trating on an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty, the right
to choose whether to have an abortion is protected as fundamental
by the due process clause. The fundamental nature of this right
can be established in two ways. First, one need only look at the
history of abortion laws in the United States and the purpose be-
hind those laws to discover that states did not significantly restrict
abortion until the late nineteenth century and then only at the in-
sistence of the medical profession.89 Protection of a woman's right
to choose an abortion is more consistent with Anglo-American his-
tory than were the restrictive laws passed in the late 1800s.
Second, previous Supreme Court precedents explaining the
breadth of the liberty interest protected by the due process clause
demonstrate that the right to choose is included within this defini-
tion of liberty. 0 Under the American regime, the liberty interest
has been held to include the freedom to choose one's actions in
areas significantly less intrusive on individual liberty than remain-
ing pregnant and bearing a child. Because those choices are pro-
tected by the due process clause, so too is the choice whether to
have an abortion.
In their review of American history, Bopp and Coleson argue
that, from the mid-nineteenth century, states enacted "stringent
prohibitions on abortion" that were "much stricter than what the
Court imposed in Roe." 91 They argue on the basis of Duncan,
therefore, that American abortion rights were not "fundamental in
the context of the criminal processes. '92 They further claim that
88. Id. at 688-89 (emphasis added).
89. See infra notes 95-120 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 121-143 and accompanying text.
91. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 239.
92. Id. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968)).
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"[v]irtually every aspect of the [Roe] Court's recitation of history
has been challenged" and "thoroughly refuted.""3 Because the
right to choose to have an abortion was restricted at one point in
history, they claim that the right is not fundamental and thereby is
subject to extensive state restriction.
Bopp and Coleson refer to articles challenging as inaccurate
the Court's view of the "quickening" distinction, the Hippocratic
oath, Plato's Republic, and historical Christian views.94 This his-
tory, however, falls outside the American statutory scheme. When
one examines the common and statutory law of the United States,
a different picture emerges. Even a quick review indicates that
women historically have had the right to choose abortion. When
that right has been restricted, the restriction was a result of an
attempt by American doctors to gain control over medicine.
The origins and evolution of American abortion policy from
1800-1900 are illuminating.9 5 No legislation addressed the subject
of abortion in the United States in 1800, and abortion was gov-
erned by traditional British common law.9 ' That law did not recog-
93. Id.
94. See id. at 239 n.430. One commentator rejects the idea that the Roe Court erred by
noting historical support for abortion.
Surprising as it may seem, the view that abortion is murder is a relatively recent
belief in American history. To be sure, there has always been a school of thought,
extending back at least to the Pythagoreans of ancient Greece, that holds that abor-
tion is wrong because the embryo is the moral equivalent of the child it will become.
Equally ancient however is the belief articulated by the Stoics: that although embryos
have some of the rights of already-born children (and these rights may increase over
the course of the pregnancy), embryos are of a different moral order, and thus to end
their existence by an abortion is not tantamount to murder.
Perhaps the most interesting thing about these two perspectives (which have co-
existed over the last two thousand years) is the fact that modern-day subscribers to
the first point of view-that abortion is always murder-have been remarkably suc-
cessful in America at persuading even opponents that their view is the more ancient
and the more prevalent one.
K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE 'POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 11 (1984). Another commentator
adds that virtually all preindustrial societies accepted abortion, considering the fetus as a
part of the mother "as the fruit is a part of the tree till it ripens and falls down." L. GORDON,
WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA 35-36
(1976).
95. See J. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA. THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
POLICY, 1800-1900 (1978). Bopp and Coleson cite Mohr for the proposition that the period
of 1860-1880 resulted in a "burst of anti-abortion legislation." Bopp & Coleson, supra note
2, at 238 n.425 (citing J. MOHR, supra, at 200). As the next few pages of this article indicate,
although this "burst" of anti-abortion legislation did occur, a thorough look at American
history shows that this legislation is, in fact, aberrational. Luker also documents this period
of history and reaches most of Mohr's conclusions as well. See K. LUKER, supra note 94, at
11-39.
96. See J. MOHR, supra note 95, at 3.
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nize abortion as criminal until after quickening, which generally
occurred late in the fourth or early in the fifth month. 7 "American
women in 1800 were legally free to attempt to terminate .. .a
pregnancy until ... that pregnancy was incontrovertibly con-
firmed by the perception of fetal movement."98
The earliest American abortion laws were passed between 1821
and 1841 in ten states." These first abortion statutes resulted from
a desire to control medical practice and the dangerous medical
treatments for abortion, rather than from public pressures to deal
with abortion as morally problematic. 00 Many doctors believed
that abortion was unjustifiable at quickening. Quickening was sim-
ply one step in the process toward gestation, and thus, according to
these doctors, it was wrong to terminate pregnancy before quicken-
ing as well. 1 1 The states did not accept this argument. Sixteen of
twenty-six states had no abortion laws as of 1841, and five of those
restricted it only after quickening. 102
By the early 1840s, abortion had become an openly practiced
service. 03 From 1840 to the 1870s, the American public "did not
consider the termination of pregnancy prior to quickening an espe-
cially serious matter.' 01 4 The chief concern of American women
during this time was their own health and safety. 05 The women
who obtained abortions were not desperate, single women con-
cerned about scandal; they were married, middle- or upper-class
women.
o106
"[T]he evolution of abortion policy in the United States was
inextricably bound up with the history of medicine and medical
practice in America, and would remain so through the rest of the
nineteenth century.' 0 7 Only after the founding of the American
Medical Association (AMA) and its drive toward professionalizing
the practice of medicine did the movement to pass restrictive abor-
tion laws take effect. 0 8 The growing AMA was officially committed
97. See id.
98. Id. at 4.
99. See id. at 20.
100. See id at 20-45.
101. See id. at 36.
102. See id. at 43.
103. See id. at 47.
104. Id. at 73.
105. See id. at 74.
106. See id. at 86.
107. Id. at 31.
108. See id. at 147-48.
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to outlawing abortion in the United States and its efforts were "the
single most important factor in altering the legal policies toward
abortion in this country."10 9 One commentator contends, however,
that these doctors were frustrated by the lack of public support for
their position110 and by the "unwillingness of American wives to
remain in their places bearing and raising children."1
To many doctors the chief purpose of women was to produce chil-
dren; anything that interfered with that purpose, or allowed women
to 'indulge' themselves in less important activities, threatened mar-
riage, the family, and the future of society itself. Abortion was a su-
preme example of such an interference for these physicians." 2
These doctors were determined to prevent women from risking
American society's future by denying their biologically determined
social imperative of bearing children. 113 Doctors spent the period
from 1860 to 1880 "educating" the American public to adopt their
view of abortion." 4 This educational effort succeeded in changing
109. Id. at 157; see also K. LuKER, supra note 94, at 29 (drive for professionalizing
medicine is the context in which doctors' political activity against abortion must be viewed).
Some doctors wanted to upgrade their profession by obtaining licensing laws to purge their
ranks of the incompetent. See id. at 28. Although they could not show direct proof of their
own medical superiority over folk practitioners, the "regular" doctors chose to claim moral
stature by opposing abortion along with touting their technical expertise and superior train-
ing. See id. at 31. Their choice of abortion as the focus of their moral crusade, rather than
other issues such as alcoholism, slavery, venereal disease, or prostitution, was calculated to
provide them with the opportunity for claiming that they were saving lives. See id. In order
to maintain control of abortion practice, however, "what the physicians did, in effect, was to
simultaneously claim both an absolute right to life for the embryo (by claiming that abor-
tion is always murder) and a conditional one (by claiming that doctors have a right to de-
clare some abortions 'necessary')." Id. at 32. Luker claims that the core of their movement,
therefore, "was areallocation of social responsibility" for determining, the rights of the em-
bryo against the rights of the woman. Id. at 35. "From the late nineteenth century until the
late 1960s, it was doctors, not women, who held the right to make that assessment." Id.
110. See J. MOHR, supra note 95, at 166.
111. Id. at 168.
112. Id. at 169.
113. See id. at 170.
114. See id. at 171. It is important to remember, however, the "public" that doctors
educated during their crusade was the male population. Women were not granted the right
to vote until the nineteenth amendment was passed in 1920 and were unable to influence
directly the laws passed by legislators. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX § 1. Thus, the political
discussion excluded women's concerns with changes in abortion policy. This essentially male
political discussion led to drastic statutory changes on women's right to choose to have an
abortion-a choice that had been available since the beginning of the American regime.
At the time of -these changes in abortion laws, married women, at least, were completely
excluded from legal recognition. Traditional legal concepts treated the husband and wife as
having only one identity: the husband's. These legal concepts prohibited the wife from: con-
tracting without his consent; entering into various professions including law; controlling her
own property or earnings; maintaining legal custody and control of her children; suing; or
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American abortion policy. Most legislation passed during this time
criminalized abortion, accepting the doctors' claims that abortion
at any time during pregnancy should be restricted.'15
Twentieth-century laws restricting abortion resulted from a
number of crusades by doctors and the public. 116 Prior to Roe, "a
great deal of pressure had built . . in favor of altering the anti-
abortion policies that twentieth-century Americans inherited from
their nineteenth-century predecessors.""' 7 A new constituency en-
tering the political field was the source of much of this pressure.
This constituency was made up of a new generation of women.
A group of women who valued motherhood, but valued it on their
.own timetable, began to make a new claim, one that had never sur-
faced in the abortion debate before this, that abortion was a wo-
man's right. Most significantly, they argued that this right to abor-
tion was essential to their right to equality-the right to be treated
as individuals rather than as potential mothers.""
The late nineteenth-century's restrictions on abortion were
making a will. Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:" Toward a History
of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rav. 819, 828-29. Given her lack of legal existence, it is not
surprising that laws were passed completely negating a woman's choice to have an abortion.
Given their total exclusion of women's lives and reality from their argument, it is also
not surprising that Bopp and Coleson use the passage of such laws to support their claim
that the "American regime of ordered liberty" did not permit abortion. Bopp and Coleson
support the Court's overturning the "separate but equal" doctrine from Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896). Likewise, they agree with the Court's substitution of the "no-state-
enforced-discrimination" rule of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and find
such a substitution to be constitutionally valid. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 196
n.92. But they criticize the Court's overturning the nineteenth-century statutes prohibiting
abortion, even though those abortion statutes were passed at about the same time as the
Plessy statute. Their willingness to recognize the need "for some modification of the rules in
light of changing circumstances" as applied to "separate-but-equal", but not as applied to
prohibitive abortion laws again underscores the incoherence of their argument. Id. at 196.
115. See J. MOHR, supra note 95, at 200. Gordon notes that this legislation "was a
severe blow to women" because, "next to the long tradition that abortion was a crime only
after quickening, these laws appear as a repeal of a time-honored right of women." L.
GORDON, supra note 94, at 57.
116. See J. MOHR, supra note 95, at 200. It is ironic that Bopp and Coleson argue that
American history excludes the right to choose to have an abortion from the concept of or-
dered liberty because of the restrictive abortion laws passed in the second half of the nine-
teenth century. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 238-39. Those laws were the result of
the physicians' crusade discussed above. Thus, it would seem that physicians are natural
allies of Bopp and Coleson. Physicians in the twentieth century, however, played a central
role in overturning those early restrictions. See IC LuKER, supra note 94, at 16. Thus, mod-
ern physicians are the focus of Bopp and Coleson's disdain. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note
2, at 191, 198-199, 283-291.
117. J. MOHR, supra note 95, at 250.
118. K. LUKER, supra note 94, at 92 (emphasis in original).
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not examples of "'normal' or 'usual' abortion policies, but rather
[were] deviations from the norm."'19
Though Mr. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion did not push this
line of argument any further, the point was evident: Americans
would come to recognize the anti-abortion laws of the late nine-
teenth century as the real aberrations in the history of their na-
tion's abortion policies and realize that the Roe guidelines repre-
sented an attempt by the Court to formulate a modern version of
the older, though ultimately more appropriate, abortion policies of
the past, in the wake of a concerted, though ultimately inappropri-
ate, attempt to impose criminal proscription as the national norm. 2 '
The history of abortion in America does not support Bopp and
Coleson's claim that the right to choose to have an abortion is not
fundamental under the American regime of ordered liberty. A
more accurate reading of history shows that the right to choose is
fundamental and was widely recognized until the late nineteenth-
century.
Court precedents also establish that the right to choose an
abortion is within the liberty interest protected by the due process
clause.'21 In Meyer v. Nebraska,'12 2 the Court broadly defined the
liberty interest protected by the due process clause. At issue was
the constitutionality of a Nebraska statute that prohibited the
teaching of any language other than English prior to the eighth
grade. 2 3 The Court considered whether the statute unreasonably
infringed on the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment. 24 The Court stated that liberty
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of [individuals] to contract, to engage in any of the common occupa-
tions of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of
119. J. MOHR, supra note 95, at 259.
120. Id. at 258 (emphasis added).
121. See, e.g., People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d. 954, 963, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359, 458 P.2d
194, 199 (1969) ("The fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear children
follows from the. . . repeated acknowledgement of a 'right of privacy' or 'liberty' in matters
related to marriage, family, and sex."); United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035
(D.D.C. 1969) ("As a secular matter, a woman's liberty and right of privacy extends to fam-
ily, marriage and sex matters and may well include the right to remove an unwanted child at
least in early stages of pregnancy.").
122. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
123. See id. at 400-01. The Court did note that "the so-called ancient or dead lan-
guages" such as Latin, Greek, and Hebrew were not proscribed by the statute. Id.
124. See id. at 399.
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[their] own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of hap-
piness by free [people].125
The Court held that the liberty interest included the freedom to
teach languages other than English to students before the eighth
grade.12 6 The Court reasoned that "[t]he American people have al-
ways regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters
of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted.1
127
Individuals have certain fundanental rights that the state must re-
spect' 28 and absent compelling circumstances, the state was not
free to infringe on these deeply rooted rights.' 29 Thus, the Court's
focus in Meyer was on access and choice in education, rather than
on the narrow issue of teaching foreign languages.
The Court protected the freedom of choice again in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters.130 In Pierce, the Court considered an Oregon
statute that required parents and guardians to send their children
to public school. The Society of Sisters argued that the statute
conflicted with "the right of parents to choose schools where their
children will receive appropriate mental and religious training
[and] the right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a
school."'' The Court held that the statute violated the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause because it "unreasonably inter-
fere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the up-
bringing and education of children under their control.'
3 2
Similarly, in Loving v. Virginia,'33 the Court found that the
due process clause protects the right to choose marriage part-
ners.134 Loving involved a Virginia statute that prohibited whites
from marrying non-whites.3 5 The Court rejected the statute as un-
constitutional, stating:
[M]arriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to
our very existence and survival. To deny this fundamental freedom
* . .is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due
125. Id.
126. See id. at 400.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 401.
129. See id. at 403.
'130. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
131. Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 534-55.
133. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
134. See id. at 12.
135. See id. at 4-5.
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process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the free-
dom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial
discriminations.1 36
Finally, in Moore v. East Cleveland,3 7 the Court focused on
the liberty interest at stake when a city attempted to prohibit ex-
tended family members from choosing to live in a single-family
home. Moore involved an East Cleveland zoning ordinance that de-
fined family to exclude a grandmother, her son, and her two grand-
sons, who were cousins, from living together in a single-family
neighborhood."3 " The Court held that the zoning ordinance vio-
lated the due process clause. 139 The Court noted that it "'has long
recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' "140 The Court stated that
numerous cases had relied on Meyer and Pierce to protect liber-
ties, including freedom of choice regarding family life and
childbearing,1 41 parental rights to custody and companionship, 142
and traditional parental authority in childrearing and education. 4 3
The liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause is broad enough to protect a woman from state
restrictions on abortion. The freedom to choose whether to have an
abortion is protected, just as the freedom to choose whether to
teach a foreign language, whether to have one's child attend public
school, whether to marry interracially, and whether to live with
one's extended family are also protected. The common thread in
all these decisions is the Court's understanding that, without pro-
136. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). The Court, however, has not protected the right of
gay men and lesbians to choose their marriage partners. See Cox, Alternative Families: Ob-
taining Traditional Family Benefits Through Litigation, Legislation and Collective Bar-
gaining, 2 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 6 n.19 (1986); Ingram, A Constitutional Critique of Restric-
tions on the Right to Marry-Why Can't Fred Marry George or Mary and Alice at the
Same Time?, 10 J. CONST. L. 33 (1984); Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the
Mid-Eighties, Part II, 11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 275, 324-25 (1986).
137. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
138. See id. at 496.
139. See id. at 505-06.
140. Id. at 499 (citation omitted)(emphasis added).
141. See id. at 500. The Court also listed the following cases as related to freedom of
,choice with respect to marriage and family life: Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1974)(mandatory leave requirement for pregnancy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)(abortion); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(contraceptives).
142. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
143. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
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tection of these choices, the liberty interest recognized in the four-
teenth amendment would have little meaning.
This liberty to make fundamental choices must include a wo-
man's right to choose whether to have an abortion. Otherwise, she
cannot retain power over her body or her life. Without such a lib-
erty interest, the state can force her to bear a child she does not
want. The impact on a woman's life and health for the nine
months that she carries the child14 4 and the risk to her life inher-
ent in childbirth are substantial.'45 Moreover, she will continue to
have a connection with that child for the rest of her life, even if
she allows her child to be adopted.146 If the Constitution's protec-
tion of liberty does not include the liberty to choose whether to
bear a child, when that choice is so fundamental to a woman's life,
then the constitution has no protections for women. Fortunately,
the Court has found the right to choose an abortion to be
protected. 47
A woman must have the right to make choices about her own
life. If abortion laws are restrictive, and thus force a woman to
bear a child and become a mother despite her personal choice not
to do so, her constitutional liberty is violated. Restrictive abortion
laws often produce enslaving impacts. These impacts can be under-
144. See Note, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of Pun-
ishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 REv. L. Soc. CHANGE 277, 294 (1987-
88).
145. See Paltrow, supra note 13, at 14.
146. A woman in the book BACK ROOMS: VOICES FROM THE ILLEGAL ABORTION ERA
spoke about giving her child up for adoption in 1952, a child who had been conceived as a
result of rape:
I had a [later] miscarriage . . . . I was almost nine months pregnant. I felt like that
was punishment. You see, having had that child and giving it up for adoption had a
tremendous effect on my life. Because of the guilt about that, I'd bring waifs home,
homeless children. We've had a series of kids that would come and stay four or five
months at a time.
E. MESSER & K. MAY, supra note 13, at 36.
This woman's daughter also spoke of the impact she observed on her mother of giving
up her child for adoption:
[My father] wants to act in some way as if having a child, bringing a child into the
world that was an unwanted child, is something that a woman can just forget. That
it's something very clinical ... that the baby was born, and the connection was sev-
ered. I don't think he quite understands that giving birth to a child is an emotional
experience. Even in the circumstances of the child conceived in rape, I think women
are able to still forge a connection with that child, separate from the act of violence
that caused the conception. I think that my father is unwilling to take a look at the
lifelong effect on my mother: that she still does this sort of thing, constantly bringing
in waifs . . . homeless children, children in trouble.
Id. at 42.
147. See supra note 39 and cases cited therein.
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stood by reading letters from women who avoided this enslavement
because abortion laws protected their liberty interests. For exam-
ple, one individual wrote:
My job on the assembly line at the plant was going well and I
needed that job desperately to support the kids. Also I had started
night school to improve my chance to get a better job. I just couldn't
have another baby-5 kids were enough for me to support. I didn't
like the idea of going thru [sic] 4 with it. I felt badly for a day or
two after the abortion. But it was the right thing to do. If I had had
the baby I would have had to quit my job and go on welfare. Instead
I was able to make ends meet and get the kids through school.'49
Another woman stated, "On the ride home from the clinic, the re-
lief was enormous. I felt happy for the first time in weeks. I had a
future again. I had my body back."'5 ° A third woman reflected,
"Personally legal abortion allowed me the choice as a teenager liv-
ing on a very poor Indian Reservation to finish growing up and
make something of my life.' 1 51 Another noted, "I cannot stress
strongly enough how that one personal decision allowed me to con-
trol my life."'15 2
Another significant aspect of liberty is the freedom to deter-
mine how to present oneself to others and how to define one's own
self-identity. Pregnancy and motherhood significantly impact a wo-
man's self-identity. Women today may spend less time pregnant
and breast-feeding than in the past, but child care is now more
demanding.153 Additionally, there is a powerful ideology associated
with motherhood. This ideology is reflected in "the belief that
motherhood is the natural, desired and ultimate goal of all 'normal'
women, and that women who deny their 'maternal instincts' are
148. The letters incorporated into NARAL's brief were reproduced without corrections
in punctuation, grammar or spelling. See Paltrow, supra note 13, at 12 n.1. They are repro-
duced verbatim here.
149. Id. at 20.
150. Id. at 23.
151. Id.
152. Id. For African American women, the enslaving impact of forced pregnancy is
especially acute, given the history of African-Americans and African-American women in
particular. See A.C.L.U., supra note 43, at 3-4.
153. See M. STANWORTH, Reproductive Technologies and the Deconstruction of Moth-
erhood in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIEs: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE 14 (M.
Stanworth ed. 1987). "[M]othering involves responsibility not only for the physical and
emotional care of children, but for detailed attention to their psychological, social and intel-




selfish, peculiar or disturbed."' 5' 4 Once a woman makes the choice
to become a mother, she takes upon herself the responsibility of
child care, which becomes "a regular and substantial part of one's
working life."'15 5 In fact, one commentator describes the pervasive
nature that assuming motherhood can entail, arguing that mother-
hood can cause a woman to develop "maternal" responses, think-
ing, and practice.156 The very development of such "maternal" as-
pects alters a woman's self-identity. Moreover, the primary social
groups with which a woman identifies pressure her to raise her
children in a way that is acceptable to them. 57 Not only does she
change her own identity by becoming a mother, but she also
changes the way in which others view her.
Considering the impact that restrictive abortion laws have on
a woman's liberty interest, her right to choose her own self-identity
and actions must be protected by the due process clause. Closely
associated with this impact is the constitutionally-protected free-
dom of intimate association.15
8
One commentator, Kenneth Karst, has argued that the free-
dom of intimate association is inherent in the Constitution.1
59
154. Id. at 15. Stanworth notes that, at a conference in Oxford in 1987, Patrick
Steptoe, the doctor responsible for the first test-tube baby, stated: "'It is a fact that there is
a biological drive to reproduce. Women who deny this drive, or in whom it is frustrated,
show disturbances in other ways.'" Id. (citation omitted). Many other doctors also share
this belief. See id.
155. S. RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 17 (1989).
156. See id. at 17-27. Ruddick differentiates between birthing labor, pregnancy and
birth or "everything a woman does to protect and sustain her fetus," and mothering. Id. at
50.
Mothering is an ongoing, organized set of activities that require discipline and active
attention. It is best divided among several people who, in an egalitarian society,
would be as likely to be male as female. Birthing labor, by contrast, is essentially
female, performed by one woman (aided in many ways by others.) Pregnant
women-especially if they !ook forward to mothering-often take a maternal atti-
tude toward the fetus, becoming deeply attached to an infant they have yet to meet.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Ruddick argues that to mother is not essentially related to
women, while to birth is essentially related to women.
157. See id. at 17.
158. The freedom of association is a fundamental right implied in the text of the first
amendment. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, supra note 42, § 11.7, at 370 (citing
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)).
159. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 637 (1980). Ac-
cord Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 199, 205 (1986)(Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Rob-
erts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). In Roberts, the Court recognized that one
line of its decisions secures the right to enter into and maintain intimate human relation-
ships against undue intrusion by the state. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18. The Court also
noted that protecting this freedom of association is necessary to safeguard individual free-
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Karst asserts that the freedom of intimate association 160 heralded
by Griswold v. Connecticut161 resulted from using substantive due
process to guarantee personal freedoms.,62 The freedom of inti-
mate association constitutionally protects the development of
individuality.16
The right to choose an abortion is inherent in the freedom of
intimate association because of the impact such a decision has on a
woman's life. Intimate associations impact the formation and
shape of not only one's self-identity, 64 but also how that identity
is perceived by others. 6 5 As Karst notes, "[t]o become a father or
mother is to assume a new status, a new identity in the eyes of
oneself and others. . . . [which] profoundly affect[s] our personal-
ities and our senses of self."'1 6
The freedom of intimate association includes the freedom of
nonassociation.-6 7 Karst uses rape and unwanted pregnancy as two
examples of wh't he calls "coerced intimate association [which is]
the most repugnant of all forms of compulsory association. "168
Karst explains that the freedom of intimate association is impli-
cated in a woman's decision whether to bear her child or to have
an abortion:
The decision to have a child, whether within or outside marriage,
strongly implicates the values of intimate association, particularly
the values of caring and commitment, intimacy, and self-identifica-
tion. The decision ranks in importance with any other a person may
make in a lifetime; an attempt to imagine state interests that would
justify governmental intrusions amounting to a practical prohibition
on procreation and childbearing takes us out of our own experience
and into an imaginary world of Malthusian nightmare.'69
Karst then draws a corollary between the decision to procreate,
and the decision not to procreate and insists that state interference
dom that is central to the constitutional scheme. See id. at 618.
160. Karst argues that it is this freedom of intimate association that ties together the
Court's cases dealing with "marriage and divorce, family relationships, the choice whether to
procreate and various forms of intimate association outside the traditional family struc-
ture." Karst, supra note 159, at 625.'
161. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
162. See Karst, supra note 159, at 626.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 635.
165. See id. at 636.
166. Id. at 637.
167. See id. at 638; L. TRIBE, supra note 54, at 312-22, 974.
168. Karst, supra note 159, at 638.
169. Id. at 640.
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with that decision can only be justified by "state interests of the
highest order.' 17 0 The freedom of intimate association or, more
correctly the freedom of intimate nonassociation, protects women
against the enforced intimate society of unwanted children, against
an unchosen commitment and a caring stained by reluctance,
against a compelled identification with the social role of parent. Co-
erced intimate association in the shape of forced child-bearing or
parenthood is no less serious an invasion of the sense of self than is
forced marriage or forced sexual intimacy.1'
The statements of women who were impacted by the decision
to choose abortion support Karst's assessments. One woman
stated:
When I was only 16 years old, in 1968, I found myself faced with an
unplanned and an untimely pregnancy. Abortions were illegal at
that time and I did not have the money or resources to know how to
go about getting one way or any other way .... During my preg-
nancy I was treated like a baby machine-an incubator without
feelings-who was to produce this child for adoption for another
couple who could not have children, for whatever reasons.12
Similarly, one couple wrote: "It is difficult to adequately de-
scribe the difference between a wanted and an unwanted preg-
nancy. It is something like the difference between darkness and
despair, and light and joy.' 7 3
Freedom of intimate association protects the right to choose
an abortion. This right is also protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause. The freedom to choose whether to iden-
tify oneself as a mother and the freedom to choose whether to have
a life-long parental connection with another human being is so
fundamental that it must fall within the "Anglo-American regime
of ordered liberty.' 74 Thus, contrary to Bopp and Coleson's argu-
ments, the right to choose whether to have an abortion is a funda-
mental interest protected by the Constitution.
B. The Right of Privacy Protects A Woman's Right to Choose
Bopp and Coleson's main argument with Roe seems to be that
170. Id.
171. Id. at 641 (footnotes omitted).
172. Paltrow, supra note 13, at 16 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 19.
174. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968).
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they do not like the framework the Court used in announcing the
right to choose an abortion. The Court held that the privacy right,
which "was broad enough to encompass" the woman's right to
choose to have an abortion, was located in the fourteenth amend-
ment's concept of personal liberty and protected by the due pro-
cess clause. 175 Bopp and Coleson belittle this protection and argue
that the use of substantive due process analysis fatally flaws the
Court's reasoning.176 Apparently, they agree with Justice White's
assertion in Bowers v. Hardwick177 that the Court is "most vulner-
able and comes nearest to illegitimacy" when it hands down deci-
sions "having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design
of the Constitution.' ' 78
Bopp and Coleson also claim that the Roe decision broke with
stare decisis because the privacy cases the Court relied on to sup-
port its decision were not related to abortion. 79 Bopp and Coleson
175. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
176. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 221.
177. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
178. Id. at 194. David A. J. Richards argues, however, that the founders intended the
constitution to be read "connotatively in light of contemporary circumstances, not denota-
tively as of 1787." Richards, supra note 54, at 826 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819)). Denotative reading limits constitutional interpretation to how the
founders would have applied the language and, thus, is insensitive to changing conditions.
See id. A connotative reading allows constitutional interpretation to remain true to the text,
but "advances the Founders' unambiguous aspiration for long-term durability of the written
Constitution." Id. Besides reading the commerce clause connotatively, Richards argues that
the preference for connotative language over denotative language also applies to protecting
individuals' rights. See id. at 826-27. Connotative interpretation, combined with the ninth
amendment's protection of rights not enumerated in the Constitution, results in a strong
argument for protecting a woman's right to choose whether to have an abortion.
Richards chastises Justice White for his claim in Bowers that the privacy cases from
Griswold to Carey have "little or no textual support in the constitutional language." Id. at
848 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191). Similarly, I chastise Bopp and Coleson for their claim
that
[t]he Court has never demonstrated the connection between the Constitution and the
Court-created right to choose abortion . . .[thereby] transgress[ing] a fundamental
principle of the rule of law-that all are bound by the law, even justices. They may
not lawfully exercise power where it is unauthorized by the Constitution.
Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 200.
While it may be true that Blackmun did not do as much as he could have to clarify the
links between the right to choose an abortion, the right to privacy, and the protections
granted by the Constitution, he did establish that such a link exists. Further decisions by
the Court have developed and cemented the link between a woman's right to choose and the
constitution's role in protecting women from overly restrictive state statutes. See supra note
39 and accompanying text.
179. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 220. The decisions on which the Court relied
are: Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Loving v. Virginia,
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applaud Richard Epstein's condemnation of Roe and his claim that
it was difficult to see how the privacy precedents cited by the
Court were linked to Roe or explained its result."' 0 They also agree
with John Hart Ely that the Court did not offer much assistance in
showing how the privacy cases can be combined with Roe to make
a coherent doctrinal unit.18 1
Perhaps Bopp, Coleson, Epstein, and Ely cannot see an inter-
nal coherence linking the privacy cases to the right to choose an
abortion enunciated in Roe because they have failed to consider
women's interests and thus have viewed the constitutional doctrine
out of context. When seen from the point of view of a woman fac-
ing a state-imposed unwanted pregnancy, it becomes clear that the
right to privacy protects a woman's right to determine whether to
remain pregnant. The essence of this right to choose is "the right
of choice over events which, by their character and consequences,
bear in a fundamental manner on the privacy of individuals."'8 2
For the woman involved, nothing less than her individual pri-
vacy-both bodily and emotionally-are at risk by any threatened
loss of her right to decide whether to bear a child or to have an
abortion.
In a trilogy of cases, Griswold v. Connecticut,"s" Eisenstadt v.
Bairds4 and Roe v. Wade,'8 5 the Court recognized its responsibil-
ity to prevent the states from enacting prohibitive contraception
and abortion laws that virtually could eliminate an individual's
right to privacy. Griswold, for example, gave constitutional recog-
nition, if not substance, to the idea of a right to privacy inherent in
the first ten amendments to the Constitution. 8 6 The decision also
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923); Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); and Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See id.
180. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 220 (citing Epstein, Substantive Due Pro-
cess by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159, 170).
181. See id. (citing Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L.
REv. 5 (1978)).
182. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 (N.D. Tex. 1970), afl'd, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).'
183. 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(right to privacy protected married couple's use of
contraceptives).
184. 405 U.S. 438 (1972)(right to privacy protected individuals' use of contraceptives).
185. 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(right to privacy protected women's right to choose an
abortion).
186. Justice Douglas specifically referred to the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth
amendments and the penumbras surrounding the specific guarantees included in those
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grounded part of its protection of the married couple's use of con-
traceptives in the traditional sanctity accorded marital relation-
ships and in the privacy that surrounds such relationships.18 7 Simi-
larly, the Eisenstadt Court, using an equal protection analysis,
found constitutional protection for unmarried individuals to use
contraceptives. 188 The Court noted that the right of privacy was
implicated by a statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives
by unmarried individuals. 8 9 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court
in an oft-quoted passage, stated:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in
the marital relationship. Yet the married couple is not an indepen-
dent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of
two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.190
Brennan also referred to Stanley v. Georgia'9' for the proposition
that fundamental rights include "the right to be free, except in
very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intru-
sions into one's privacy."' 92
Bopp and Coleson claim that these privacy cases are unrelated
to the right to choose recognized in Roe.""5 In particular, they criti-
cize the Court for failing to show how a right to privacy, assuming
such a right exists, includes a right to choose to have an abortion
and how substantive due process provides the doctrinal analysis
for such a right.194 Bopp and Coleson seem to be arguing that be-
cause the Court's previous privacy decisions did not include a case
on abortion, Roe could not be decided on privacy grounds.
amendments. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
187. See id. at 486.
188. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55.
189. See id. at 453.
190. Id. (emphasis in original).
191. 394 U.S. 557 (1965).
192. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 n.10 (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564). Brennan
went on to quote from Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States
that "[t]he makers of our Constitution . . .sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Govern-
ment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized [people]." Id. at 453-454 n.10 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1968)(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
193. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 220.
194. See id. at 221.
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. The error in Bopp and Coleson's reading of Roe again comes
from their conspicuous and seemingly conscious"' exclusion of
women from the abortion discussion. Women denied abortions due
to restrictive state abortion laws have no trouble finding an inexo-
rable link between a constitutionally-protected right to privacy
and the right to choose. If the privacy right enunciated by the
Court in Griswold and Eisenstadt is to mean anything for women,
it is incumbent that it include the right to choose. When abortion
rights are restricted, the fear of unwanted pregnancy subverts a
woman's sexuality:
My husband and I take our responsibility to our children and any
potential children seriously. I take no chance with my contraception
except its own failure rate. And any of them can fail. I hunger for a
time when this will stop, when we can know and not simply assume
that our plans to prevent conception will work. But until that time
we must have the right to choose, either to abort or to give birth.
Without that choice we love in the shadow of fear.196
Griswold and Eisenstadt make it clear that the right of indi-
viduals, married or unmarried, to engage in nonprocreative sexual
intimacy is protected by the Constitution.197 If this freedom is to
mean anything for women,. then women must have the right to en-
gage in sexual intimacy without the fear of unwanted pregnancy.'98
Mitigating this fear requires protecting the woman's right to
choose an abortion when contraceptive failure occurs. 9
195. It would seem deliberate that, in an article spanning 174 pages, the authors only
raised the impact of unwanted pregnancy on women forced to bear children by restrictive
abortion laws a handful of times.
196. Paltrow, supra note 13, at 19.
197. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). The right to engage in nonprocreative sexual freedom, however, has
not been extended to gays and lesbians. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
198. See Karst, supra note 159, at 654. In fact, birth control was designed specifically
to permit sexual intercourse whenever desired without the risk of pregnancy. See L.
GORDON, supra note 94, at 100. No method of birth control, however, currently exists that is
completely effective at preventing pregnancy. See THE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH COLLEC-
TIvE, THE NEW OUR BODIES, OUR SELVES: A BooK BY AND FOR WOMEN 224 (1984).
199. In fact, Catherine MacKinnon argues that abortion laws exist as they are, not to
protect women from unwanted pregnancy, but to protect men in their desire for heterosex-
ual sex.
[U]nder conditions of gender inequality, sexual liberation in this sense does not so
much free women sexually as it frees male sexual aggression. The availability of abor-
tion removes the one real consequence men could not easily ignore, the one remaining
legitimated reason that women have had for refusing sex besides the headaches. As




Even though most women will not use abortion as a post-con-
ception form of birth control, the right to privacy includes the
right to engage in sexual activity without the fear that the state
will force a woman to continue an unwanted pregnancy. When an
unwanted pregnancy occurs, a woman must be given the option, on
her own initiative, to terminate her pregnancy. Without such an
option, when a state-sanctioned pregnancy forces a woman into the
role of mother and childbearer, privacy has little meaning for her.
A state cannot be permitted to impose unwanted pregnancy on
women in contravention of their own desires. To require women to
carry unwanted pregnancies to term would contradict the constitu-
tional protections women have gained in the last two decades. It
would force them back into the domestic sphere where they were
simply "breeders" for their husbands and families.
Bopp and Coleson's argument against constitutional protec-
tion for the right to choose is based on their assertion that the
right to abortion is not fundamental in the American concept of
ordered liberty. As noted above,200 this assertion incorrectly states
the nature of the rights protected by the Constitution. Rather than
being a right to have an abortion, there is a right to make funda-
mental decisions that affect an individual, which includes the right
to choose to have an abortion. The Constitution protects a wo-
man's choice and it is the protection of that choice that gains con-
stitutional significance.
Bopp and Coleson also miss the constitutional significance of
the Court's much maligned decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.20 1
They claim that Bowers was decided correctly, while Roe was de-
cided incorrectly, because Bowers accurately noted the historical
prohibition of gay20 2 sodomy in American history.20 3 They also ar-
C. MAcKINNON, supra note 58, at 190 (footnote omitted).
200. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
201. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). A few of the numerous articles that condemn the Court's
decision in Bowers are: Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Constitution: Homosexual Persons
as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 143 (1988); Rubenfeld, The
Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737 (1989); Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent
by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 648 (1987); Note, Bowers v. Hardwick: Is There
a Right to Privacy?, 37 AM. U.L. REv. 487 (1988); Note, Bowers v. Hardwick: The Supreme
Court Closes the Door on the Right to Privacy and Opens the Door to the Bedroom, 64
DEN. U. L. REv. 599 (1988); Note, The Constitutional Privacy Doctrine After Bowers v.
Hardwick: Rethinking the Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 So. CAL. L. REv.
1297 (1989); Note, The Supreme Court as Super Legislature Emasculates the Right to Pri-
vacy: Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986), 21 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 853 (1987).
202. See Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Per-
sons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 802 (1979). Rivera explains that "gay" is
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gue that the historical treatment in Bowers was accurate, if not
complete, and that Bowers correctly noted that the practice of gay
sodomy "was not rooted in the traditions of this nation nor essen-
tial to a scheme of ordered liberty. 20 4 Therefore, according to
Bopp and Coleson, the right to engage in homosexual sodomy is
not fundamental and is subject to restriction, and even prohibition,
by the states.205 Justice White, writing for the Court in Bowers,
similarly noted that the earlier privacy cases were related to fam-
ily, marriage or procreation, and he argued that no connection has
been made between those familial activities and gay sodomy.2 °0
Thus, Justice White concluded that no fundamental right to en-
gage in gay sodomy exists because of the historical proscriptions
against those activities. 0 7
But the question in Bowers should not have been whether the
practice of gay sodomy was legal or illegal historically. Rather, the
question should have been whether the Constitution protects an
individual's decision to practice gay sodomy. That fundamental
choice is protected by the right to privacy, just as the choice
whether to possess obscene materials in one's home, 08 the choice
whether to use contraceptives,20 9 the choice to marry inter-
racially,210 and the choice to have an abortion,211 among others, are
protected by the privacy right. Both Justice Blackmun and Justice
Stevens in their Bowers dissents note this misconstruction of the
constitutional question. Justice Blackmun emphasizes that previ-
ous privacy cases have protected the decision whether to marry
and the decision whether to have a child.2 2 As Justice Blackmun
synonymous with the term "homosexual." See id. This Article uses the term "gay" in place
of "homosexual."
203. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 240-41.
204. Id. at 241.
205. See id.
206. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 186-91 (1986).
207. See id. at 192-93.
208. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
209. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
210. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
211. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
212. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204-05 (1986)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun notes:
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through their inti-
mate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that
there may be many 'right' ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of
the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose
the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds.
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concludes, "we have recognized that a necessary corollary of giving
individuals freedom to choose how to conduct their lives is accept-
ance of the fact that different individuals will make different
choices. ' ' 213 Justice Stevens also emphasized that fundamental de-
cisions are protected by the privacy right.
[H]e wrote broadly of the 'individual's right to make certain unusu-
ally important decisions' and 'respect for the dignity of individual
choice,' rejecting the notion that such liberty belongs to heterosexu-
als alone. 'From the standpoint of the individual, the homosexual
and the heterosexual have the same interest in deciding how he will
live his own life, and, more narrowly, how he will conduct himself in
his personal and voluntary associations with his companions.' 214
The Bowers Court erred because. it focused too narrowly on the
"practice" regulated by the Georgia statute, and it did not recog-
nize the significance of an individual's decision to the concepts of
privacy and personhood. If the Court had focused on constitutional
protection for the choice involved in the practice of gay sodomy,
then Bowers would have resulted in the same protection for the
choice that was reached in Roe and the other privacy precedents.
Rather than supporting Bopp and Coleson's claim that Roe was
decided wrongly, Bowers indicates the type of error that the Su-
preme Court avoided by its decision in Roe. Rather than demon-
strating that Roe merits reversal, Bopp and Coleson have under-
scored the fact that Bowers merits reversal.
C. Conclusion
Bopp and Coleson join others in the antichoice movement who
make much of what they view as the seemingly insignificant sacri-
fice women should be required, by the state, to make in bearing a
child they do not want. "Married women, also, from the fear of
labor, from indisposition to have the care, the expense, or the
trouble of children, or some other motive equally trifling and de-
grading, have solicited that the embryo should be destroyed by
their medical attendant. '215 They seem to agree with other anti-
choice supporters who "speak so contemptuously of women's real-
Id. at 205 (emphasis in original).
213. Id. at 205-06.
214. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality,
77 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 535 (1989)(quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 217-19 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
215. K. LUKER, supra note 94, at 22 (emphasis added).
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life circumstances, or call an unwanted child an
'inconvenience.' "216
Bopp and Coleson miss the point: "Forgetting your umbrella is
an inconvenience. Having a baby-even if she gives it up for adop-
tion-is a major event in a woman's life, and deserves, one would
think, some respect. 2 17 The woman facing an abortion realizes the
significance of the choice she is making. She realizes that a state
that is so concerned about her fetus that it requires state-imposed
pregnancy and makes "a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion"21' seems forever to lose its interest once childbirth is
complete. But the woman is not free similarly to lose her interest.
A woman forced to carry an unwanted pregnancy to term will find
that Aid to Families for Dependent Children only will provide $560
per month to support this "favored" child and her mother.219 She
will also find that by the year 2000 the United States poverty pop-
ulation will be solely composed of women and children,220 that a
woman will earn approximately two-thirds of the full-time wage
that a male earns,221 and that she will receive little assistance from
the authorities if she decides to defend herself or her children from
a spouse or partner who abuses them.222
Women realize the commitment they are making by deciding
to bring a child into the world. They understand that the conflict
is not what the legal system and Bopp and Coleson like to charac-
terize as an adversary conflict between the mother and the fetus. 23
"[Women] asked, in effect, whether it is responsible or irresponsi-
ble, moral or immoral, to sustain and deepen an attachment under
circumstances in which you cannot be, for whatever reason, re-
sponsible, and in which you cannot exercise care? '224 Given the
216. Pollitt, Men and Abortion, 20 UTNE READER 116 (March/April 1987).
217. Id.
218. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1960)(quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
474 (1977)).
219. Aid to Families for Dependent Children also provides up to $694 per month for
two children and their mother. Interview with Inquiry Unit of California Department of
Social Services (Nov. 28, 1989).
220. See L. WEITZMAN, THE DIvORCE REvOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND Eco-
NOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 350 (1985).
221. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation and Women Workers, 6
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 19, 25 (1980).
222. See Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in
Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 149, 151 (1978).
223. See Gilligan, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation,




impact that bearing a child has on a woman's life, she must be left
to make her own choice. While the state and Bopp and Coleson are
willing to be involved and sanctimonious before the fetus is born,
that involvement and concern dissipates immediately after birth.
The state denies a woman's liberty and privacy just long enough to
force her to make a life-long connection to a child she does not
choose to bear, and after that she is left on her own.
Once Bopp and Coleson's argument is understood for what it
does-completely exclude the woman from the abortion debate-it
becomes clear that the argument cannot stand. Once the woman is
included back into the debate, it becomes clear that there can be
no debate. The choice belongs to the woman.
III. THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE AN ABORTION IS LIMITED, NOT
INVIOLATE
The first two sections of this Article have established that the
Constitution protects a woman's right to choose an abortion. This
section now addresses Bopp and Coleson's claim that this right has
become inviolate.
Bopp and Coleson claim that the Court has altered its usual
treatment of protecting privacy rights by making the right to
choose an abortion virtually inviolate.22 ' They claim that, although
the Court in Roe stated that it was not announcing an unlimited
right to choose an abortion, in fact, it has treated the right as being
virtually unrestricted.2 26
Referring to the Court's decision in Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 227 Bopp and Coleson
claim that "the Court has struck down virtually every legislative
attempt to assert [the state's] compelling interests" in protecting
maternal health and potential life.228 They argue that in trying to
make the right to choose an abortion virtually inviolate, "Thorn-
burgh indicates the extremes to which the Court will go in avoiding
its own precedent in Roe. '229 Bopp and Coleson cite Justice
White's Thornburgh dissent for the proposition that "the majority
225. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 222-34. Bopp and Coleson. note that most
aspects of the privacy right are subject to limitations justifying state regulation. See id. at
225. As this section of the Article argues, the abortion aspect of the privacy right is also
subject to state regulation.
226. See id. at 218-19 (abortion right is subject to minor health regulations).
227. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).




viewed Pennsylvania's efforts to codify what the Court previously
said was allowable regulation as 'some sinister conspiracy' and
'change[d] the rules to invalidate what before would have seemed
permissible.' "230 They further assert that the Court was "creating
a climate of instability, unpredictability, inconsistency, un-
workability, and unfairness. "231
Upon closer examination, however, it is evident that in inter-
preting Thornburgh as well as other abortion precedents, Bopp
and Coleson draw an inaccurate picture of abortion jurisprudence.
When states have enacted statutes that actually relate to their rec-
ognized interests in protecting maternal health and protecting po-
tential life, the Court has upheld those statutes. Only when the
states have surpassed their authority and have enacted statutes
impinging on a woman's protected right to choose an abortion, es-
pecially during the first trimester when the state's interests are
minimal, has the Court rejected abortion statutes.232 After care-
fully reviewing the cases according to the type of restriction cre-
ated by the state, it is evident that Bopp and Coleson incorrectly
characterize the right to choose to have an abortion as inviolate. In
fact, it becomes easy to question whether the Court has neglected
its responsibility to protect women's interests as recognized in Roe.
This section begins with an analysis of Roe's recognition of
both a woman's right to choose an abortion2 33 and the state's inter-
ests in protecting maternal health, medical standards and potential
life.234 The section challenges the assertions that the state's inter-
ests are compelling throughout pregnancy and that a nonarbitrary
line does not exist for determining when abortion should be per-
mitted. A review of the various state restrictions on abortion chal-
lenged in the Court follows. The section then demonstrates that
the Court consistently upholds state statutes if they advance com-
230. Id. at 215 (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 799 (White, J., dissenting)). Justice
White further argued that the majority's opinion "finds no justification in the Court's previ-
ous holdings, departs from sound principles of constitutional and statutory interpretation,
and unduly limits the State's power to implement the legitimate (and in some circumstances
compelling) policy of encouraging normal childbirth in preference to abortion." Thornburgh,
476 U.S. at 798 (White, J., dissenting).
231. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 215 (citing Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 821, 826-27
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
232. The Court in Roe recognized that, during the first trimester when the state's
other interests in protecting maternal health and potential life are not compelling, the state
has an interest in establishing medical standards for abortions. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 154-55 (1973).
233. See id. at 153.
234. See id. at 154-55.
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pelling interests and do not interfere with a woman's fundamental
right to choose an abortion. This section concludes with the finding
that Bopp and Coleson are incorrect in asserting that the right to
choose an abortion has become inviolate.
A. The Fundamental Right to Choose an Abortion and the
State's Compelling Interests
Throughout history, a woman's right to abortion has not been
inviolate. Both English and American common law and American
statutory law for much of the nineteenth century restricted abor-
tion after quickening. 3 5 The Roe Court also acknowledged that a
woman's right to an abortion was not absolute.23 6 The Court recog-
nized that the state has important interests in protecting health,
preserving medical standards and safeguarding prenatal life.
Therefore, the state could regulate in those areas.237 The Roe
Court concluded that even though the privacy right includes the
right to choose an abortion, that right is not unconditional and
must be considered in light of state interests. 38
To accommodate both the woman's right to choose and the
state's interests, the Roe Court established the trimester frame-
work for evaluating state abortion regulation.23 9 During the first
trimester, the woman and her doctor are free to make the abortion
decision except for minimal state regulation of abortion provid-
ers.240 During the second trimester, the state may regulate abor-
tions "in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health."'2 41
During the third trimester, the state may regulate and prohibit
abortions, except when an abortion is required to save the life of
the mother.242 In creating this framework, the Roe Court essen-
tially balanced the sensitive interests involved in abortions and al-
lowed for increasing state regulations as the pregnancy length-
ened.2 3 Thus, Roe established that a woman's right to an abortion
is not inviolate because the state can regulate abortion when state
235. See supra notes 95-115 and accompanying text; Note, Constitutional Line Draw-
ing: Abortion Versus Homosexuality-Why the Difference?, 12 OKLA. CiTY U.L. REv. 865,
868-69 (1987).
236. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id. at 164-65.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 164.




interests in maternal health and protecting potential life are
compelling.
Even Justice O'Connor has acknowledged that the right to
choose an abortion is a limited fundamental right.244 She has
claimed, however, that states' compelling interests in ensuring ma-
ternal health and protecting potential human life exist throughout
pregnancy.245 Justice O'Connor believes that the Roe framework is
on a "collision course" with itself because changes in medical tech-
nology will alter the points at which the state's and a woman's in-
terests are compelling.246 Justice O'Connor argued that "[i]t is cer-
tainly reasonable to believe that fetal viability in the first trimester
of pregnancy may be possible in the not too distant future. '24 7
Thus, she claimed the Roe trimester framework is "inherently tied
to the state of medical technology that exists whenever particular
litigation ensues. '248
Justice O'Connor would limit judicial scrutiny of state restric-
tions on abortion to whether the law bears a rational relationship
to legitimate purposes in advancing the state's compelling inter-
ests.249 Only when the restriction imposes an "undue burden" on
the abortion decision would Justice O'Connor apply heightened
scrutiny.250 Justice O'Connor has read the Court's abortion cases as
finding an undue burden "in situations involving absolute obsta-
cles or severe limitations on the abortion decision," not wherever a
state regulation "may 'inhibit' abortions to some degree." '251
Justice O'Connor has asserted that the Court's decisions in
Maher v. Roe252 and Harris v. McRae253 establish this standard.5 4
In Maher and Harris, the Court determined that states were not
required to pay for abortions for poor women choosing them-even
though those states would pay for childbirth costs for the same
women. 255 Justice O'Connor seems to believe that constitutional
244. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 465-66
n.10 (1983)(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
245. See id. at 461.
246. Id. at 458.
247. Id. at 457.
248. Id. at 458.
249. See id. at 453.
250. See id.; see also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976)(restriction not uncon-
stitutional unless it unduly burdens right to seek abortion).
251. Akron, 462 U.S. at 464.
252. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
253. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
254. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 464.
255. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 480 (Court refused to proscribe state government funding
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protection of a woman's right to choose abortion arises only in the
face of absolute prohibition. As Justice Powell noted in Akron,
Justice O'Connor would "uphold virtually any abortion regulation
under a rational-basis test. 2 56 Justice Powell argued, however,
of non-therapeutic abortions); Harris, 448 U.S. at 326 (states not obligated to fund neces-
sary abortions under Title XIX of Medicare). That states are not required to fund abortions
for women on Medicaid results from the Court's decision to place the constitutional protec-
tion for the right to choose an abortion within the right to privacy. "Asserting that deci-
sional privacy was nevertheless constitutionally intact, the Court stated that 'although the
government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of
choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation.'" C. MACKINNON, supra note 58, at
187 (citations omitted).
The point is that Roe v. Wade presumes that government nonintervention in the
private sphere promotes a woman's freedom of choice. When the alternative is jail,
there is much to be said for this presumption. But the McRae result sustains the
meaning of privacy in Roe: women are guaranteed by the public no more than what
they can get in private-what they can extract through their intimate associations
with men. Women with privileges, including class privileges, get rights.
Id. at 191. Locating the right to choose an abortion within the right to privacy, rather than
providing women with an affirmative right, means that women are simply guaranteed of
government not intervening into the choice. What of the woman who chooses to have an
abortion but is too poor to pay for one?'Government's refusal to assist her financially trans-
lates into a denial of any meaningful choice. According to Professor Tribe:
[T]he unavailability of abortion to such a woman follows from her lack of funds only
by virtue of government's quite conscious decision to treat the needed medical proce-
dure as a purely private commodity available only to those who can pay the market
price ....
[That decision is] especially dubious by the government's simultaneous deci-
sion-at considerable net public cost-to take childbirth for the same poor women off
the private market by funding the necessary medical care within a comprehensive
medical benefits program. ..
Such governmental choices, in fact, require women to sacrifice their liberty, and
quite literally their labor, in order to enable others to survive and grow in circum-
stances likely to create lifelong attachments and burdens.
Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the
Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REv. 330, 336-37 (1985)(footnotes omitted)(emphasis
in original); see also Olsen, supra note 54, at 109-17 (discussing abortion funding cases as
limiting privacy analysis); Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive Laws, Women of Color, and Low-
Income Women, 11 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 15, 16-20 (1989)(discussing difficulties poor
women and women of color have in obtaining early abortions).
256. Akron, 462 U.S. at 420 n.1. (Powell, J.). Justice O'Connor did just that by voting
with the plurality to uphold the abortion statute in Webster. See Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064 (1989)(O'Connor, J., concurring). However, she seems to
have modified her view that the Roe framework is unworkable. Despite the desires of the
plurality and Justice Scalia to overrule Roe, she refused to do so in this case. She noted that
none of Missouri's viability testing requirements "conflict with any of the Court's past deci-
sions concerning state regulation of abortion." Id. at 3060. Thus, Justice O'Connor found no
occasion to even consider whether Roe should be overruled. See id. at 3060-61. It is com-
mendable that Justice O'Connor refused the opportunity to overrule Roe considering her
vociferous condemnation of it in Akron and Thornburgh. See Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 714, 814-15, 828 (1986); Akron, 462 U.S. at
458-59.
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that such limited review of state restrictions on abortion "is wholly
incompatible with the existence of the fundamental right recog-
nized in Roe v. Wade. 257
Justice O'Connor's concern that the Roe trimester system will
collapse on itself is unfounded. As Justice Blackmun noted in his
Webster dissent, some of the medical literature has established
that there is an "anatomic threshold" for fetal viability of 23-24
weeks gestation.258 Because the states' interest in protecting poten-
tial life is limited to the time after viability, and because viability
is set at 23-24 weeks at the earliest, the Roe trimester framework
continues to adequately delineate the competing interests.259
Despite Justice O'Connor's and Justice White's claims to the
contrary, 26  nonarbitrary lines can be drawn to differentiate the
status of the unborn. Clifford Grobstein articulated the issue of the
status of the unborn as follows:
When we view the public world of real people dealing with each
other in the complex and subtle interactions of social life, it seems
ludicrous to suggest that concepts appropriate to that realm should
be extended to an individual cell at the bare limit of ordinary visi-
257. Akron, 462 U.S. at 421 n.1.
258. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3075-76 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting Brief for
American Medical Association, et al, as Amici Curiae at 7, Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989)).
259. The Webster Court, however, upheld a Missouri statute that presumed viability
at 20 weeks due to a four week margin of error in estimating gestational age. See id. at 3055.
If any aspect of the Roe framework is unsound, it is the portion that recognizes the state
interest in protecting maternal health throughout the second trimester. In Roe, the Court
recognized the state's interest as becoming compelling during the second trimester because,
until the end of the first trimester, the risk from abortion is less than the risk from child-
birth. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). Today, however, the risk from abortion
remains less than the risk from childbirth well into the second trimester. See Akron, 462
U.S. at 429 n.11. If anything, a state's compelling interest in protecting maternal health
should be limited to when the risk from abortion is greater than the risk from childbirth.
The Court in Akron, however, declined to make such a change in the Roe framework despite
"substantial evidence that developments in the past decade, particularly the development of
a much safer method for performing second-trimester abortions . . . have extended the pe-
riod in which abortions are safer than childbirth." Id. (citation omitted). The Court deter-
mined that when the state adopts a regulation governing abortions during the second tri-
mester, "the determinative question should be whether there is a reasonable medical basis
for the regulation. The comparison between abortion and childbirth mortality rates may be
relevant only where the State employs a health rationale as a justification for a complete
prohibition on abortions in certain circumstances." Id. (citation omitted).
260. Justice O'Connor has claimed that Roe's trimester framework is outmoded. See
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice White has stated that the
fetus "bears in its cells all the genetic information that characterizes a member of the spe-
cies [and] there is no nonarbitrary line separating a fetus'from a child or, indeed, an adult
human being." Id. at 792 (White, J., dissenting).
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bility. It makes as much sense as declaring acorns to be oak trees
and selling them at oak tree prices. Less ludicrous, but much more
difficult to answer, are questions about what should, in fact, be the
status of the zygote and-most difficult of all to answer-exactly
when in the course of development full human status should be
assigned.281
Grobstein argues that fetal development is a process and that pro-
viding the fetus with a legal status could occur at any point in the
six separable stages of individuality that occur while the fetus is in
womb.262 Those six stages are genetic, developmental, functional,
behavioral, psychic, and social.2 63 He argues that it makes just as
much sense to accord status to the unborn at some point during
this development as to accord it immediately upon fertilization.
Grobstein posits that if all six aspects are essential to full human
status, "it would be reasonable to withhold such status until all six
were clearly present to some defined level. '2 64
Certain nonarbitrary lines during fetal development could jus-
tify differing levels of status for the unborn. For example, if one
equates human status with the fetus' ability to experience pain,
human status should not be afforded until at least twenty weeks
when the fetus' nervous system is established.2 65 To the extent that
inner experience and pain depend on brain function, they cannot
be present at any time during the first thirteen weeks.2 66 In fact,
some researchers believe that "an adequate neural substrate for ex-
perienced pain does not exist" until about thirty weeks.2 67 Thus,
any of these points could establish a nonarbitrary point for afford-
ing status to the fetus.
261. C. GROBSTEIN, SCIENCE AND THE UNBORN: CHOOSING HUMAN FUTURES 5-6
(1988)(emphasis added). Grobstein has been an embryologist for forty years and is a profes-
sor emeritus of biological science and public policy at the University of California, San Di-
ego. See Hall, When Does Life Begin?, A Conversation with Clifford Grobstein: Does Life
Begin? PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept. 1989, at 43.
262. C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 261, at 22. Grobstein notes that the right-to-life move-
ment's characterization of life beginning at conception is scientifically an egregious oversim-
plification. See id. at 23-24. He states that "[e]ven while recognizing the profound impor-
tance of this first step, it is essential to keep in mind how much is yet missing at this early
stage from what will be present when full human individuality is achieved. Uniqueness in
the genetic sense has been realized but, for' example, unity or singleness has not ....
[S]ingleness arises independently and at a significantly later time." Id. at 25-26.
263. See id.
264. Id. at 37.
265. See id. at 40-41. Twenty weeks was the point of viability assumed in the Missouri
statute at issue in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3055 (1989).
266. See C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 261, at 54.
267. Id. at 55.
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At a minimum, the preceding discussion establishes that ac-
cording human status involves complex medical, legal, and philo-
sophical considerations. The theological perspective alone makes
the discussion seem simple. The Vatican claims that "[t]he human
being must be respected-as a person-from the very first instant
of his [or her] existence . . . Human life must be absolutely
respected and protected from the moment of conception. '268 Simi-
larly simplistic is Missouri's claim that "[tihe life of each human
being begins at conception." '269
Although the Missouri statute makes such a claim, it certainly
is not a secular claim. As Justice Stevens noted in his Webster dis-
sent, however, "[o]ur jurisprudence. . . has consistently required a
secular basis for valid legislation. ' 27 0 He observed that the Mis-
souri legislature constitutionally may not endorse a particular reli-
gious tradition within its statutory scheme. 7 1 Not all Christian
faiths agree with the claim that "life begins at conception. '27 2 Ac-
cording to the Jewish faith, only when a child is born does it be-
come a person. . Thus, after discounting any of Missouri's legisla-
tive purposes for its statutory scheme, Justice Stevens concluded
that the statute violates the Constitution. 4
This section has argued that the Roe framework of balancing a
woman's fundamental right to choose an abortion against the
state's compelling interests in protecting maternal health and po-
tential life is the most appropriate way to address the difficult is-
sues raised by abortion. Among the several points during fetal de-
velopment that could be used for attaching legal status or
personhood, viability is the most coherent. It is logical to locate
that status at the time that the fetus is capable of surviving with-
268. Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
269. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205.1(1)(Vernon Supp. 1990). Grobstein would take issue with
the Vatican's position and Missouri's statutory declaration. He points out that "there is no
instant of conception; the process of fertilization (or syngamy) extends over many hours." C.
GROBSTEIN, supra note 261, at 14.
270. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3082 (1989)(Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
271.- See id. at 3085.
272. Id. at 3082.
273. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973)(Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also
Paltrow, supra note 13, at 22 ("Being Jewish, our teaching is that the child becomes a full-
fledged person only when it takes the first breath. Until then it does not have 'human'
standing.")
274. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3084-85 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Stevens found the statute to be unconstitutional because it had "substan-
tive impact on the freedom to use contraception" as determined in Griswold. Id. at 3085. He
also found that the statute violated the establishment clause of the first amendment. Id.
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out the woman. Given the appropriateness of the Roe framework,
it becomes incumbent to challenge Bopp and Coleson's claims that
the Court has negated the states' interests in its attempt to make
the abortion right inviolate. Careful analysis of the Court's deci-
sions with regard to state restrictions on record keeping and in-
formed consent, maternal health, and potential life verifies that
the Court has been faithful to the Roe framework.
B. Restrictions During the First Trimester
The Roe Court held that during the first trimester a woman is
free, in consultation with her doctor, to choose to have an abortion
without state interference. 5 During that time, the state has no
compelling interest that would allow it to interfere with the wo-
man's fundamental right. The Court recognized, however, that the
state may regulate abortions in the first trimester consistent with
its regulation of other medical procedures. 78 In response, some
states have passed statutes requiring record keeping and informed
consent. In cases where such statutes were concerned with record
keeping or informed consent, the Court has found them constitu-
tional. When the statutes were in reality designed to restrict a wo-
man's right to procure an abortion, the Court has found them
unconstitutional.
1. Record Keeping by Abortion Facilities
The Missouri abortion statute reviewed in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth27 required, in part, that healthcare facili-
ties and physicians maintain records of abortions performed at all
stages. 7 8 Under the statute each abortion facility and physician
had to maintain records of abortions including relevant maternal
health and life data. 9 Planned Parenthood challenged this statute
as interfering with the woman's right to choose an abortion during
275. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
276. See id. at 149-50. States have passed statutes adding restrictions on the woman's
right to choose an abortion. These restrictions included approval of abortion by hospital
committees; a requirement that three physicians approve the abortion decision; residency
requirements; abortion counseling; and a twenty-four hour waiting period before the abor-
tion. The Court struck down these restrictions in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) and
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), as
unconstitutional.
277. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).





the first trimester.2 80 The Court held that record keeping require-
ments were constitutionally permissible so long as they are reason-
ably related to the goal of preserving maternal health and respect
the need for confidentiality.281 The Court found the Missouri rec-
ord keeping requirement to be reasonably related to promoting the
State's interest in safeguarding the health of its female resi-
dents.28 2 The Court noted that in Missouri physicians must report
births, deaths, and communicable diseases, and that their prescrip-
tion of controlled substances is strictly regulated by the state.83
The Court found the State's abortion record-keeping requirements
to be similar, and to impose no significant impact on the abortion
decision because the records were to be kept confidential.284 It also
found that the record keeping requirement advanced the State's
interest in safeguarding the health of its female residents and that
it would likely be a valuable resource for medical findings.285
The statute in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists288 contained a record keeping requirement
pertaining to second and third trimester abortions.287 The provi-
sion required the physician to compile a substantial amount of in-
formation, including some nonmedical data,2 88 in a report that
would be accessible to the public.28 9 Even though the report was
not considered to be a public record, each report was "'available
for public inspection and copying within 15 days of receipt in a
form which will not lead to the disclosure of the identity of any
person filing a report.'"290 The Thornburgh Court held that these
280. See id. at 79-80.
281. See id. at 80.
282. See id. at 81.
283. See id. at 81 n.13 (citations omitted).
284. See id. at 81.
285. See id.
286. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
287. See id. at 765.
288. See id. The information required included:
identification of the performing and referring physicians and of the facility or agency;
information as to the woman's political subdivision and State of residence, age, race,
marital status, and number of prior pregnancies; the date of her last menstrual period
and the probable gestational age; the basis for any judgment that a medical emer-
gency existed; the basis for any determination of nonviability; and the method of
payment for the abortion. The report is to be signed by the attending physician.
Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3214(b) (1982)).
289. See id.
290. Id. (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66 et seq. (Purdon 1959 & Supp. 1985)).




requirements went beyond the state's limited health related inter-
ests and were unconstitutional.2 91
Bopp and Coleson condemn the Court's decision in Thorn-
burgh, claiming that the record failed to show that identification
was the purpose of the reporting requirements.292 For support,
they refer to the trial court's finding that the requirements of con-
fidentiality prevented any invasion on the patient's privacy that
would significantly burden the abortion decision. 93 They also
claim that the purpose of the reports was to ensure that doctors
did not perform postviability abortions and to further the state's
medical interests through accurate record keeping.294 The reports
were available to the public, however, and the statute imposed no
limitation on the use of the reports.295 The Court concluded that
there was no legitimate state interest involved in Pennsylvania's
record keeping requirement due to the extent of information re-
quired and the report's accessibility to the public.296 The Court
contrasted the record keeping requirement in Danforth, which was
held valid because it required less information and provided that
the reports were to be used for statistical purposes only.2 97 Bopp
and Coleson's claim that the reports required in Thornburgh fur-
thered the state's interests is belied by the public nature of the
reports. If they were to be used only for such limited purposes,
they would not need to be available to the public.
The Thornburgh Court concluded that the availability of the
report to the public might chill the right to choose-an abortion and
thus was unconstitutional.9 8 The Court recognized that the deci-
sion to abort a pregnancy is an extremely private one that must be
safeguarded in a way that guarantees anonymity.299 The Court ob-
served: "'It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision
that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny and in de-
fiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign or other third par-
ties.' 300 Thus, when a record keeping requirement was imposed
291. See id. at 766-67.
292. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 298.
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 766.
296. See id. at 765-66.
297. See id. at 766-67.
298. See id. at 767-68.
299. See id. at 766.
300. Id. at 766 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655 (1979)(Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
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for the purpose of furthering the state's medical interests, the
Court has been willing to uphold its constitutionality. When the
requirement allowed public access to the records and potentially
chilled a woman's decision to have an abortion, however, the Court
overturned the statute. This simply amounts to a balancing of the
states' interests against the woman's interests.
2. Informed Written Consent to an Abortion During the First
Trimester3"'
The Court in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth3 02 also consid-
ered whether a state could constitutionally require a woman to give
informed written consent to an abortion during the first trimes-
ter.30 3 The Missouri statute at issue in the case defined informed
written consent as the woman's attestation in writing of her freely
given and informed consent to having the abortion.304 The Court
agreed with the district court's decision that this provision merely
included abortion with those other medical operations for which
consent was required and was therefore constitutional. 3 5
In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,306
301. In addition to restrictions based on a woman's informed consent, other attempts
have been made to use consent requirements by third parties to veto a woman's choice to
have an abortion. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976), the Court
rejected a requirement for spousal consent during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. Because a
state cannot proscribe first trimester abortions, it cannot delegate that power to a spouse.
See id.
Additionally, the Danforth Court held that a state cannot require parental consent to a
minor's abortion in the first trimester. See id. at 74. The state, however, can impose a pa-
rental consent requirement if an alternative procedure is available to obtain judicial permis-
sion for the abortion. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-48 (1979). The minor must be
given the opportunity to demonstrate, independently of her parents' wishes, either 1) that
she is mature enough to make the abortion decision herself, or 2) that, even if she is not
mature enough to make the decision, the abortion is in her best interest. See id. at 643-44.
Thus, the Court will not permit the states to enact statutes allowing third-parties to
veto a woman's decision to have an abortion. The parental consent issue, however, is still
being litigated with the Supreme Court having issued decisions in Hodgson v. Minnesota,
110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990), and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972
(1990), upholding statutes that require parental notification unless a judicial bypass proce-
dure is used.
302. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
303. See id. at 65.
304. See id. (citing M.O.H.R. 1211, 77th Gen. Assb., 2d Sess. § 3(2) (1974)).
305. See id. at 66-67. The Court noted, however, that "apparently ... the only other
Missouri statutes concerned with consent for general medical or surgical care related to per-
sons committed to the Missouri State chest hospital, or to mental or correctional institu-
tions." Id. at 66 n.6 (citations omitted).
306. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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the Court stated that the legality of provisions requiring informed
written consent for an abortion depend upon whether they are le-
gitimately related to the state's interest in protecting maternal
health.30 7 The Court held that the Danforth decision, which ac-
knowledged the state's interest in guaranteeing informed consent,
would not support abortion restrictions created to sway the wo-
man's informed choice between abortion or childbirth. 08 Many of
the Ohio statute's information requirements being challenged in
Akron were designed not to advise, but to influence the woman to
withhold consent and to interfere with the judgment of the preg-
nant woman's physician.3 09 The Court found the requirement of
informed written consent and the other restrictions in Akron un-
constitutionally expanded the State's interest in securing informed
consent beyond acceptable limits.3 10
In Thornburgh v. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 311
the Court considered, in part, the constitutional validity of a Penn-
sylvania statute that required the "voluntary and informed con-
sent" of a woman to have an abortion.3 12 Under the statute, physi-
cians who did not provide information relating to informed consent
would be subject to penalties. 13 Other persons who failed to pro-
vide information connected to informed consent would be subject
to criminal sanctions.32 4 In striking down the provision, the Court
relied on language in its Akron decision stating "the State may not
require the delivery of information designed 'to influence the wo-
man's informed choice between abortion or childbirth.' """' In Ak-
ron, the Court had found the ordinance defective for two reasons.
First, the information was not required to apprise, but to influence
the woman to withhold her agreement to the abortion.316 Second,
the fixed body of material to be disseminated, irrespective of the
situation of the patient, interfered with the judgment of the wo-
man's physician and inflicted a straitjacket upon the physician.31 7
307. See id. at 443.
308. See id. at 443-44.
309. See id. at 444-45.
310. See id. at 444.
311. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
312. Id. at 759 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(a) (1982)).
313. See id.
314. See id. at 759-60 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(c) (1982)).
315. Id. at 760 (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462
U.S. 416, 443-44 (1983)).




The Thornburgh Court determined that these reasons also ap-
plied to the Pennsylvania statute.31 8 The Court declared that the
provision failed to meet the standard announced in Akron because
a variety of information had to be given to the woman twenty-four
hours before her consent was given, some of which had to be given
by the physician. 19 The Court found that this provision made the
physician an agent of the State because it required the physician
to disseminate information provided by the State.3 20 The Pennsyl-
vania provision also failed the Akron test because the information
concerning informed consent contained nonmedical information ir-
relevant to the abortion procedure. Thus, the Court concluded that
the provision advanced no legitimate state goal and was therefore
unconstitutional.3 2'
Bopp and Coleson assert that the statute in Thornburgh sim-
ply required that objective information relevant to informed con-
sent be disseminated to women pursuing abortions.3 22 They refer,
for example, to the requirement that the woman was merely to be
advised of the probable gestational age of her fetus. 23 They claim
that this "was "non-judgmental, relevant information which is cer-
tainly not objectionable under the Akron test. '3 24
Upon closer examination of Thornburgh, however, one sees
that the Pennsylvania statute required more than informing the
woman of the fetus' gestational age. Rather, it mandated detailed
descriptions of the actual characteristics of the fetus at two-week
intervals.3 25 Thornburgh's majority referred to this information as
"a parade of horribles. '3 26 The Court also found that the informa-
tion, no matter how impartial, was overinclusive because it was
nonmedical and not always pertinent to the woman's decision.32 7
The Court found that explaining the characteristics of the fetus
may serve only to puzzle and castigate the woman, and elevate her
anxiety-functions counter to approved medical procedure.
318. See id.
319. See id. at 764.
320. See id. at 763.
321. See id.
322. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 211.
323. See id. at 294.
324. Id.
325. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 761 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3208(a)(2) (1982)).
326. Id. at 760 (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462
U.S. 416, 445 (1983)).




The Court also found that requiring that the woman be in-
formed of the availability of medical assistance and the father's
responsibility for some child support was simply a thinly veiled at-
tempt to deter the abortion decision. 29 The Court determined that
these requirements were nonmedical and inappropriate because,
for a patient with a life-endangering pregnancy, the "'information'
in its very rendition may be cruel as well as destructive of the phy-
sician-patient relationship. '"330 The Thornburgh Court found that
the requirements that the physician advise the woman of "'detri-
mental physical and psychological effects' and of all 'particular
medical risks'" complicated medical care, raised the patient's anx-
iety, and encroached upon the physician's discretion. 31 The Court
characterized this category of forced information as the "antithesis
of informed consent. ' 332 The Court concluded that this provision
exposed the actual anti-abortion nature of the statute because
Pennsylvania did not, and certainly would not, require comparable
disclosure of every conceivable danger of necessary surgery or of
simple vaccination.3
In contrast, the Danforth Court allowed the imposition of an
informed consent requirement that brought abortion in line with
other medical procedures in the state that also require informed
consent.334 The State's interest in medical procedures and mater-
nal health justified this imposition, even during the first trimes-
ter. 35 The informed consent statutes in Akron and Thornburgh,
however, were struck down because they did not simply elicit the
woman's consent; they were also intended to affect her decision.
Under Akron and Thornburgh, therefore, the state could not,
under the guise of obtaining informed consent, require information
actually intended to affect the woman's constitutionally-protected
right to choose to have an abortion.
C. Restrictions Concerning Maternal Health
The Roe Court determined that the states have a compelling
329. See id. at 763.
330. Id. The Court also stated that a rape victim should not have to listen to gratui-
tous counsel that an unknown perpetrator is responsible for support if she carries the preg-
nancy to term. See id.
331. Id. at 764 (quoting PA. CONST. STAT. § 3205(a)(1)(ii)-(iii) (1982)).
332. Id.
333. See id.




interest in protecting maternal health following the first trimes-
ter."' That interest permits states to regulate abortions "to the
extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation
and protection of maternal health. '331 Many states, however, have
imposed restrictions on abortions under the guise of protecting
maternal health during the second trimester when those restric-
tions actually did not further maternal health and, in come cases,
actually jeopardized it. Although the Court has been willing to up-
hold restrictions that further maternal health, it has been quick to
reject those that do not.
1. Use of Saline Amniocentesis as an Abortion Method after the
First Trimester
The Missouri statute reviewed in Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth proscribed the use of saline amniocentesis as an abortion
method after the first trimester." 8 The Court determined that this
restriction was not related reasonably to safeguarding maternal
health in the second trimester. Saline amniocentesis was a widely
used method, alternative methods were not widely available, and
the statute did not prohibit more dangerous methods of abor-
tion.3 9 In sum, the Court found the restriction on saline amni-
ocentesis an "unreasonable and arbitrary regulation designed...
to inhibit abortion." 340 The restriction was, therefore, unconstitu-
tional because it was not reasonably related to safeguarding mater-
nal health.3 41
336. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
337. Id.
338. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75-76 (citing MISSOURI H.R. REP. No. 1211, 77th Gen.
Ass., 2d Sess., § 9 (1974)).
339. See id. at 77-79.
340. Id. at 79.
341. See id. Bopp and Coleson condemn the Thornburgh majority's recital of Pennsyl-
vania history on abortion statutes "as if it were evidence of some sinister conspiracy." Bopp
& Coleson, supra note 2, at 209 (quoting Thornburgh v. College of Obstetricians & Gynecol-
ogists, 476 U.S. 747, 798 (1986)(White, J., dissenting)). This is not surprising given the at-
tempts by states, as seen in Danforth and Thornburgh, to protect potential life by risking
maternal health and survival. Given the states' interests in protecting the woman's health,
which the Roe Court found to be compelling, it is incongruous that states would turn around
and impose statutes that actually place the woman at increased risk. It is difficult to be
sympathetic to a state's attempts to protect a fetus when it expresses its "concern" by plac-
ing a living, fully developed woman at risk to do so. It was this incongruity that led the
Court in Danforth to strike down the restriction on saline amniocentesis.
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2. The Hospital Accreditation Requirement for Abortions Per-
formed After the First Trimester
The Georgia abortion statute in Doe v. Bolton342 specified that
abortions were to be performed in hospitals approved by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) 43 JCAH did
not have governmental sponsorship.34 4 It was concerned with qual-
ity medical care, but did not have a specific concern with abortion
as a medical or surgical procedure. 45 The Court noted that
"[s]ome courts have held that a JCAH-accreditation requirement
is an overbroad infringement on fundamental rights" because it
did not concern the specific medical difficulties and perils of the
abortion operation.3 4 The Court found that Georgia's JCAH-ac-
creditation requirement was unconstitutional because it was not
reasonably 'related to a state objective. 47
The Doe Court observed that facilities other than hospitals
were able to perform abortions. The Georgia hospitalization re-
quirement therefore was invalid because it did not exclude first tri-
mester abortions from its scope. 48 The Court asserted that Geor-
gia could ratify principles for licensing all facilities where abortions
may be performed, so long as those stahdards were reasonably re-
lated to legitimate state objectives. 3 49 Georgia had not, however,
offered convincing evidence to demonstrate that only JCAH-ac-
credited hospitals satisfied its legitimate interest in guaranteeing
maternal health.3 50
The ordinance35' examined in Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health also required that abortions performed after the
first trimester be performed in a hospital.3 52 The Akron Court
found this restriction unconstitutional because it did not advance
an important state health objective 353 and placed serious restraints
342. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
343. See id. at 193. The statute referred to is GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(b)(4) (1968).
See id. at 202.
344. See id. at 193.
345. See id. at 193 n.12.
346. Id. at 194.
347. See id.
348. See id. at 195.
349. See id. at 194-95.
350. See id. at 195.
351. AKRON, OHIO CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870.03 (1978).
352. 462 U.S. 416, 431-32 (1983).
353. See id. at 433-38 (citing AKRON, OHIO CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870.03 (1978)).
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on the abortion decision, such as unnecessary added cost.35 4 The
Court stated that this hospitalization requirement may force
women to travel great distances to locate available facilities, which
would result in monetary expense and additional health risks. 55
The Court noted that certain abortion procedures that were com-
monly used for second trimester abortions could be accomplished
just as safely and less expensively at outpatient facilities than at
full service hospitals256 According to the Court, "'present medical
knowledge'. . . convincingly undercuts Akron's justification for re-
quiring that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hos-
pital. 35 7 Because the statute imposed requirements unrelated to
maternal health with additional expense and risk, it was an uncon-
stitutional imposition on the woman's right to choose to have an
abortion.
In Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft,35  an abortion
statute also required that all second-trimester abortions be per-
formed in a hospital. 59 The Ashcroft Court again found the provi-
sion unconstitutional based on the Akron decision because it "un-
reasonably infringe[d] upon a woman's constitutional right to
354. See id. at 434-35. The Court noted that an "[fln-hospital abortion costs $850-
$900, whereas a dilation-and-evacuation (D&E) abortion performed in a clinic costs $350-
$400." Id. at 435 (citation omitted).
355. See id.
356. See id. at 435-37.
357. Id. at 437 (citations and footnote omitted). Bopp and Coleson state that the
Court's decision in Akron constituted stare decisis abuse because the Court did not follow
its summary affirmance of a second-trimester hospitalization requirement in Gary-North-
west Indiana Women's Services, Inc. v. Orr, 451 U.S. 934 (1981). See Bopp & Coleson, supra
note 2, at 207. They note that the Court acknowledged its summary affirmance, but dis-
missed the case as not binding. See id. at 207 (citing Akron, 462 U.S. at 433 n.18). They
claim that the Court was incorrect in doing so because its asserted reason for rejecting Orr,
that the plaintiff had not proven the safety of second-trimester abortions outside of hospi-
tal, had been determined by the trial court not to be dispositive. See id. This type of an
intricate analysis of a summary affirmance, however, is risky. In 1979, the Court noted that
"summary affirmances have considerably less precedential value than an opinion on the
merits" and "'upon fuller consideration of an issue under plenary review, the Court has not
hesitated to discard a rule which a line of summary affirmances may appear to have estab-
lished.'" Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 180-81
(1979) (citations omitted). Additionally, a "summary disposition affirms only the judgment
of the court below, and no more may be read into our action than was essential to sustain
that judgment." Id. at 183 (citation omitted). Thus, the Court's summary affirmance in Orr
indicated only agreement with the judgment of the court below (that the plaintiffs had not
succeeded in challenging the hospitalization requirement in that case) and nothing more.
358. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
359. See id. at 478 (citing Mo. RE.v. STAT. § 188.025 (Vernon Supp. 1982)). "Hospital"
was not defined in the Missouri statutes. See id. at 481-82 n.6. The Court, therefore, pre-
sumed that hospital meant "a general acute care facility." Id.
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obtain an abortion."360 The statute failed to promote its purported
interest in protecting maternal health.
The abortion statute in Simopoulos v. Virginia361 also re-
quired that second-trimester abortions be performed in licensed
hospitals.6 2 A Virginia statute by implication defined hospitals as
including outpatient clinics36 3 and defined outpatient clinics as
places where abortions could be performed.364 As a result, Virginia
allowed abortions in outpatient clinics that were licensed as hospi-
tals.6 5 The Court found that the hospitalization requirement in
Simopoulos, unlike those in Akron and Ashcroft, to be constitu-
tional.36 6 Whereas the statutes in Akron and Ashcroft effectively
required that second-trimester abortions be conducted in full-ser-
vice hospitals, even though they could be performed as safely in
outpatient clinics, the statute in Simopoulos allowed second- tri-
mester abortions to be performed in licensed outpatient clinics
that qualified for "hospital status" under Virginia law.3 67 The
Court found that Virginia had a legitimate interest in regulating
second-trimester abortions and defining standards for facilities in
which these abortions could be performed. 68 The regulations were
constitutional because the licensing of clinics where second-trimes-
ter abortions were performed was not an unreasonable means by
which the state furthered its compelling interest in "protecting the
woman's own health and safety."6 9
D. Restrictions Concerning Potential Life
1. Physician's Standard of Care
The abortion statute in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth370
established a standard of care for the physician performing an
abortion by providing that any physician who failed to maintain
the life of the fetus after an abortion would be guilty of man-
360. Id. at 482 (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 439).
361. 462 U.S. 506 (1983).
362. See id. at 509-12 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-73 (1982)).
363. See id. at 512-14 (citing Vk CODE ANN. § 32.1-123.1 (1979)).
364. See id. (citing Virginia Dept. of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure
of Out-patient Hospitals § 20.2.11 (1977)).
365. See id. at 515.
366. See id. at 516-19.
367. See id. at 516.
368. See id. at 516-17.
369. Id. at 518-19 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973)).
370. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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slaughter.37' The Court determined that this standard required the
physicians to use their skill, care and diligence to safeguard the life
and health of the fetus, but noted that the statute did not specify
whether this standard would only apply after viability had been
reached. Because the provision would require physicians to pre-
serve the fetus regardless of viability, the Court concluded that the
statute unconstitutionally extended the State's interest in poten-
tial life before viability.i72
2. Postviability Abortions
Section 5(a) of the Pennsylvania abortion statute at issue in
Colautti v. Franklin37 3 provided that if the fetus was viable, or if
the physician had sufficient reason to believe the fetus was viable,
he or she would have to exercise that degree of professional skill,
care and diligence that would allow the fetus to survive the abor-
tion, so long as a different technique was not needed to preserve
the life or health of the mother.7 4
The Court determined that this viability-determination re-
quirement was ambiguous and void for vagueness. 75 The Court
noted that, in criminal law, a statute must give a person of average
intelligence adequate warning of what is criminally punishable or
the statute is unconstitutionally vague. 76 The statute in Colautti
did not meet the Court's standard for two reasons. First, the stat-
ute was unclear about the standard of care that was to be applied
to give the physicians "sufficient reason to believe that the fetus
may be viable.' 377 Second, that statute was unclear as to the dis-
tinction between "viable" and "may be viable.' 7 8 More specifi-
cally, the requirement was unconstitutionally vague because it was
unclear whether the statute required an individual-subjective or a
collective-objective standard.3 79 The decision whether the fetus "is
viable" was specifically established based on the attending physi-
cian's "experience, judgment or professional competence," an indi-
371. See id. at 82 (citing MISSOURi H.R. REP. No. 1211, 77th Gen. Assb., 2d Sess., §
6(1) (1974)).
372. See id. at 83.
373. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
374. See id. at 380 n.1 (citing 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977)).
375. See id. at 390.
376. See id. (citation omitted).
377. Id. at 391 (quoting 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977)).
378. Id. at 392-93 (quoting 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977)).
379. See id. at 391.
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vidual point of reference.380 The Court found, however, that the
standard for whether there was "sufficient reason to believe that
the fetus may be viable" was unclear. It could have been the per-
spective of the attending physician or that of other medical people
or a committee of experts. 81
Furthermore, the Collauti statute was unclear as to whether
the phrase "may be viable" meant viability as the phrase had been
interpreted in Roe and Planned Parenthood, or whether it referred
to an unknown penumbral or "gray" area prior to the stage of via-
bility.3 8 2 Thus, the statute threatened a physician with potential
civil or criminal liability without clearly stating what actions would
subject him or her to such liability.383
The phrase "may be viable" could also have referred to a dis-
tinct condition separate from "viability. ' 384 Before viability, how-
ever, the state may not seek to further its interest in potential life
"by directly restricting a woman's decision whether or not to ter-
minate her pregnancy. 3 85 Thus, viability is the critical point and
"no attempt to stretch the point of viability one way or another"
has ever been accepted by the Court.8 6 Because the statute in Col-
lauti potentially allowed regulation of abortions before viability for
the purpose of protecting potential life, it was inconsistent with
Roe, and, therefore, unconstitutional.
In Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft,38 7 the Court
examined a statute that required the presence of a second physi-
cian at the abortion of a viable fetus to safeguard the life of the
fetus, so long as safeguarding the fetus did not endanger the health
or life of the mother. 88 The Court in Ashcroft stated that by giv-
ing prompt medical care to a fetus delivered alive, the second phy-
380. Id. (quoting 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977)).
381. Id. (quoting 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977)).
382. Id. (quoting 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977)(citations omitted)).
383. See id. at 394.
384. Id. at 393 (quoting 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977)).
385. Id. at 386. The Colautti Court noted that the Court's decision in Maher v. Roe
might seem contradictory in that it authorized the state to withhold funding of abortions for
indigent women even though that might influence the abortion decision before viability. See
id. at 386 n.7 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471-77 (1977)). But the Colautti Court also
noted that the state may not impose direct obstacles, such as the potential criminal penal-
ties present in this case, to further its interest in the potential life of the fetus before viabil-
ity. See id.
386. Id. at 389.
387. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
388. See id. 483 (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.030.2 (Vernon Supp. 1982)). The Court
noted that most third-trimester abortions were emergency operations necessary to save the
life or health of the mother because, otherwise, they were prohibited. See id. at 485.
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sician could ensure that the State's interests were protected more
adequately than if only one physician were present. 89 Because the
second physician furthered the state's compelling interest in safe-
guarding life during the birth of a viable fetus, the Court found the
requirement constitutional.390
The statute in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists39' also contained several requirements for
postviability abortions. First, it required a physician to use the
same standard of care for postviability abortions as was used dur-
ing the birth of any child intended to be born and not aborted. It
also required a physician to use the abortion technique that pro-
vided the best opportunity to abort the fetus alive, unless doing so
presented a significantly greater medical risk to the mother's
health.3 92 The Court in Thornburgh agreed with the court of ap-
peals' finding that these provisions would force physicians to
choose between the life of the mother and that of the fetus, with
no requirement that maternal health be the paramount considera-
tion. 93 The Court had rejected this type of "trade-off" between
the woman's health and additional "percentage points" of fetal
survival in Colautti v. Franklin,3 94 and it likewise rejected it in
Thornburgh.95
The Thornburgh Court also rejected the constitutionality of a
statute that required a second physician be present during abor-
tions performed when viability would be possible. 96 The statute
ordered the second physician to take "all reasonable steps neces-
sary. . . to preserve the child's life and health. 3 97 Unlike the stat-
ute in Ashcroft, however, this statute did not contain an exception
for emergency situations when the mother's health was endangered
while waiting for the second physician's arrival.3 19  Because it
"[contained] fio such comforting or helpful language and [evinced]
no intent to protect a woman whose life may be at risk," the Court
389. See id.
390. See id. at 485-86.
391. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
392. See id. at 768 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3210(b)-(c) (Purdon 1982)).
393. See id. at 768-69.
394. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979).
395. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 769.
396. See id. at 769-72 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3210(c) (Purdon 1982)).
397. Id. at 770 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3210(c) (Purdon 1982)).
398. See id. at 770-71 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3210(c) (Purdon 1982)). Actu-
ally, no express emergency exception existed in Ashcroft either. But Justice Powell found
the exception implicit in the Missouri statute's recognition that preserving the fetus could
not pose an increased risk to the mother. See id. at 770 (citation omitted).
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found this provision was intended to chill the performance of late
abortions, and thus, was unconstitutional. 99
3. Viability Testing of Fetuses
The statute in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services400 re-
quired the testing of fetuses aged twenty weeks or more before an
abortion could be performed.40 1 The Court construed this restric-
tion as requiring only those tests that are useful to determine via-
bility.40 2 The Court found this requirement was related to "pro-
moting the state's interest in potential human life. '403 The
Webster Court upheld this viability-testing requirement,0 4 effec-
tively creating a presumption of viability at twenty weeks. 'The
Court determined that the additional expense for the abortion, and
the added restraint on the physician's discretion, were justified by
the furtherance of the state's interest in protecting potential life.40 5
Therefore, the Court found that the statute was constitutional.
Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality's viability-testing
decision, but did not agree that the viability-testing requirements
conflicted with prior Supreme Court abortion decisions.0 6 There-
fore, Justice O'Connor found it unnecessary to reinspect the con-
stitutional soundness of Roe.407 Asserting that it is not the Court's
custom to resolve issues of a constitutional character unless essen-
tial to a resolution of the case,40 8 Justice O'Connor declared that
"when the constitutional invalidity of a State's abortion statute ac-
tually turns on the constitutional validity of Roe, there will be time
enough to examine Roe [a]nd to do so carefully. 40 9
E. Conclusion
Bopp and Coleson's attempt to denigrate the Court's abortion
decisions as lacking internal coherence and as being unfaithful to
the Roe trimester framework are unsupported. As demonstrated in
399. Id. at 770-71.
400. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
401. See id. at 3047 (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.029 (1986)).
402. See id. at 3054-55.
403. Id. at 3055.
404. See id. at 3055, 3057.
405. See id. at 3057.
406. See id. at 3060 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
407. See id.
408. See id. at 3060-61 (citation omitted).
409. Id. at 3061.
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this section, the Court has not treated the right to choose an abor-
tion as inviolate. When faced with statutes advancing a state's
compelling interests, the Court has upheld the constitutionality of
those statutes. Bopp and Coleson appear unable to differentiate
between legitimate attempts to advance those state interests and
illegitimate attempts to negate a woman's constitutionally-pro-
tected right to choose.
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF FETUSES IN CONTEXTS OTHER THAN
ABORTION
This section will establish that the protection that Roe affords
to a fetus is harmonious with protections provided in other areas of
the law.410 The most important of these areas are tort, wrongful
death, equity and criminal law. An effective, harmonious and prov-
able legal standard is necessary for consistent judicial treatment of
the fetus. The viability distinction promulgated in Roe and its
progeny creates just such a consistent framework.
Although Bopp and Coleson agree that such a framework is
needed, they argue that Roe has made a "consistent and principled
policy of protecting unborn life almost impossible. '411 Their argu-
ment is based on the Court's refusal to recognize the state's inter-
est in protecting the fetus throughout pregnancy. 4 2 Although they
concede that national guidelines on abortion have resulted from
Roe,413 they agree with Justice O'Connor's contention that these
guidelines have resulted in an illogical treatment of the fetus.414
This contention results from Bopp and Coleson's failure to recog-
nize a woman's interests along with the interests of the fetus and
the state.41 5
When the interests of the woman are taken into account, it
becomes clear that the Roe framework, of protecting the woman's
choice before viability, and protecting the state's interest in the
410. Actually, Roe does not directly protect the fetus but rather recognizes the state's
compelling interest in the fetus at viability. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
411. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 246.
412. See id. at 246-47.
413.. See id. at 246.
414. See id. (citing Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 459
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
415. Bopp and Coleson's exclusion of women from any input into the analysis makes
their argument not only inhuman but inappropriate. By restricting their discussion to preg-
nancy, fetal rights, and state interests, they have completely eliminated the woman and her
rights. By so doing, they have provided less protection for the woman than they say the Roe
Court provided for the fetus.
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fetus after viability, also is the correct framework in legal areas
other than abortion. This section reviews the existing law in other
legal areas and demonstrates that it fits within the Roe viability
framework. Bopp and Coleson incorrectly characterize these areas
of the law as being in conflict with the legal framework of Roe.
This illusory conflict does not withstand close scrutiny.
A. Tort Law
This section will consider the treatment of the fetus in tort
law. After a brief discussion of the history of the decisions on pre-
natal injury, this section will conclude that viability serves as the
appropriate basis for providing a consistent and fair judicial deter-
mination of the divergent interests of the pregnant woman and the
state.
Historically, a fetus was seen as a part of the mother and any
damage to the unborn, nonviable fetus was actionable only by the
mother. 16 The courts were unwilling to impose upon a defendant a
"duty of conduct to a person who was not in existence at the time"
that a tortious act occurred.417 This reasoning changed, 418 however,
and now "every state has recognized prenatal harm as a legitimate
cause of action for a child subsequently born. ' 419 In general, the
only two requirements for recognition of this harm are that the
fetus be born alive and that the harm occur prior to birth.420 The
crux of this analysis is that the right to recover attaches only when
the child is born alive. 42' Although every jurisdiction still main-
416. Justice Holmes articulated an early application of this idea in Dietrich v. Inhabi-
tants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884). In Dietrich, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
denied recovery for injuries to the fetus because it saw the fetus as having no separate exis-
tence. See id. at 17.
417. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at
367-68 (5th ed. 1984).
418. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140-42 (D.D.C. 1946) (allowing mal-
practice action by child injured in womb, despite lack of common-law precedent).
419. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 248-49 (citation omitted). This would seem to
be a logical corollary to the viability distinction of Roe in that tort recovery is allowed only
if the fetus has been born, irrespective of when the injury occurred. Thus, it would be logical
to presume that recovery for fetal injury would not be allowed if the fetus had never been
born.
420. See Mathieu, Respecting Liberty and Preventing Harm: Limits of State Inter-
vention in Prenatal Choice, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 19, 25 (1985).
421. This concept is harmonious with Roe, where the Court found that there had been
a reluctance to attribute any legal rights to fetuses, "except in narrowly defined situations
and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161
(1973). One of the oldest of these situations is the ability of the fetus to inherit. To recog-
nize the parents' desire to provide for children not yet born, courts have been willing to
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tains this requirement, there is a split of authority on whether re-
covery should be allowed for injuries that occur before viability.422
Regardless of this split, the significant point, for purposes of an
applicable standard, is not when the injury occurred but when the
claim arises. No claim for recovery can be made until after the
child is born. It is irrelevant whether the injury occurred before or
after viability. As one commentator stated:
In compensating those infants who have been harmed as the result
of prenatal injuries and were born alive, the courts have implicitly
found that the true damage is suffered after birth, i.e., having to go
through life with some defect or deformity. Thus, the damage has
not actually been suffered by the viable or non-viable fetus, but by
the human being who must now live with the handicap caused by
the tortfeasor.423
Bopp and Coleson fail to recognize this point and instead as-
sert justifications for allowing recovery for previability injuries.424
None of their justifications is appropriate to the issue of recovery;
each is used simply to ascertain when the harm occurred, and,
therefore, whether recovery should be allowed. What Bopp and
Coleson fault as the "viability test"425 is merely the means by
which some courts distinguish between recoverable and
nonrecoverable harms once the fetus has been born. It is the re-
quirement of birth that is important for recovery, not the timing of
the harm.
Thus, by requiring the fetus to be born before a tort cause of
action arises, courts require that the fetus become a person under
grant the fetus status as a person, if it is subsequently born alive. "Relatives of the decedent
conceived before his [or her] death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in
the lifetime of the decedent." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (1982).
422. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 417, § 55, at 368. In New York, for
example, the courts distinguish between previability and postviability injuries. In Albala v.
City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269, 429 N.E.2d 786, 787 (1981), the New York Court of Ap-
peals refused recovery for injuries suffered before viability. In Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y.
349, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951), the New York Court of Appeals allowed a surviving fetus to
recover for prenatal, postviability injury. The Albala court distinguished Woods by noting
that "at the time the tort [was] committed [in Woods] there [were] two identifiable beings
within the zone of danger, each of whom [was] owed a duty independent of the other."
Albala, 429 N.E.2d at 787. Cf. Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line, 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d
727 (1956); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31
N.J. 353, i57 A.2d 497 (1960).
423. Mathieu, supra note 420, at 25 n.21.
424. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 249-50. Among the justifications they pre-
sent are the irrelevance of fetal age, the similar type of harm, biological separability, and




the Roe definition.42 The fact that the courts allow recovery for
injuries that occur before viability is not determinative. There is
no right to recover until the child is born. Therefore, existing tort
law is consistent with the Roe methodology.
B. Wrongful Death
Wrongful death statutes generally provide for a cause of action
based on "any wrongful act, neglect or default" that causes
death.2 7 Interpreting these statutes under Roe's fourteenth
amendment definition of a fetus as not being a person, a wrongful
death cause of action for fetuses would be limited to those injured
in utero, born alive, but subsequently dying. Some states, however,
depending on their underlying statutory definition of "person" or
the way in which their courts choose to interpret the wrongful
death statutes, allow recovery for stillborns.4 28 In Summerfield v.
Superior Court,429 for example, the Arizona Supreme Court held
that the word "person" in Arizona's wrongful death statutes in-
cludes "a stillborn, viable fetus."4 30 In harmonizing its decision
with Roe, the court stated:
[W]hile we recognize the binding authority of Roe v. Wade, we do
not believe that allowing recovery to the parents of a tortiously
killed, viable fetus negates the pronouncement in Roe that the state
has an interest in the fetus after viability. In fact, it may further the
policy of Roe by permitting the state to protect 'a woman's right to
continue her pregnancy by recognizing [recovery] ... for harm
caused by interference with that right.'43 '
Other states, however, have chosen not to include a stillborn
fetus within the wrongful death statutory definition of "person."43 2
426. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
427. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 417, § 127, at 946.
428. See, e.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 368 (1974) (parents
of eight and one-half month old stillborn fetus entitled to maintain action for fetus' wrong-
ful death); Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712, 724 (1985) (word
"person" in wrongful death statute includes stillborn, viable fetus, allowing parents to main-
tain action for wrongful death).
429. 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985).
430. 698 P.2d at 723.
431. Id. (quoting Kadu, The Law of Tortious Parental Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45
Mo. L. REv. 639, 664 (1980)).
432. See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977); In
re Troy D., 215 Cal. App. 3d 889, 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1989); Raymond v. Bartsch, 84 A.D.2d
60, 447 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1981); Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1980); Olejniczak v.
Whitten, 605 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. 1980).
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The United States Supreme Court in Roe addressed this issue by
noting that:
Some States permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an
action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries. Such an ac-
tion, however, would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' in-
terest and is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most,
represents only the potentiality of life .... In short, the unborn
have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole
sense.
433
Courts have given various justifications for the inclusion of
stillborns under wrongful death statutes, such as a willingness to
consider the unborn to be persons, the capacity of postviable fe-
tuses for biological independence, legislative intent to include fe-
tuses within the definitional confines of the statute, and medical
evidence of viability as a basis for the separability of the fetus.3 4
Such justifications and distinctions again do nothing to under-
mine the attachment of viability as the basis for recovery and are
entirely harmonious with the thinking of Roe as to when the inter-
ests of the fetus and the state should be given weight. By limiting
recovery for stillborn fetuses to those attaining viability, the courts
are, in essence, imposing the same trimester scheme found in
Roe.435 Only when the fetus has attained the requisite level of via-
bility should it be capable of inclusion under the wrongful death
statutes. It is at viability that the state's interest in preserving life
is strong enough to warrant inclusion.
Bopp and Coleson also argue that Roe should be overturned
because the lower courts have applied it inconsistently.436 This is
an appropriate justification for overturning a Supreme Court deci-
sion, but does not compel the Court to grant review . One of the
basic procedural rules the Court considers in granting review is
whether the lower courts are in disagreement.437 The decision to
433. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (footnote omitted).
434. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 417, § 55, at 369-70; Comment,
Torts-The Right of Recovery for the Tortious Death of the Unborn, 27 HOWARD L.J. 1649
(1984).
435. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
436. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 254, 351-52.
437. Sup. CT. R. 17.1. The Rule states:
1. A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and
will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The fol-
lowing, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, indicate
the character reasons that will be considered.
(a) When a federal court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the
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grant review is left to the discretion of the Court.
Finally, in making these decisions on recoverable harms,
courts have
glossed over crucial differences between fetuses and persons, and
have lost sight of the interests that narrow legal recognition of the
fetus traditionally has attempted to protect. . . . Most importantly,
the courts have failed to recognize the fundamental differences
betweeen a woman deciding to terminate her own pregnancy and a
third party intruding upon her body to end that pregnancy against
her will. 438
C. Equity
Another area of the law in which recognition for the fetus has
been asserted is equity. Some courts use their equitable power to
impose restrictions on women that the existing statutory schemes
and common law would not allow. Bopp and Coleson discuss this
equitable power as a source for recognizing fetal rights over
women's rights.439 They argue that the fetus is gaining increased
rights through courts that are willing to protect the health of the
fetus over that of the woman.440 For example, decisions regarding
in-womb surgery, court-ordered caesarian sections, and suits recog-
nizing maternal prenatal negligence suggest that the rights of the
fetus may be increasing.441 What Bopp and Coleson fail to realize
is that the "right" to be born healthy attaches only after the right
to be born attaches, which again rests upon the viability of the
decision of another federal court of appeals on the same matter; or has decided a
federal question in a way in conflict with a state court of last resort; or has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanc-
tioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's
power of supervision.
(b) When a state court of last resort has decided a federal question in a way in
conflict with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a federal court of
appeals.
(c) When a state court or a federal court of appeals has decided an important
question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or
has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with applicable decisions of this
Court.
Id.
438. Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional
Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 610-11 (1986).
439. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 261-68.
440. See id. at 262.
441. See Note, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of Pun-





Bopp and Coleson then argue that fetal rights are linked to
the right of parents to be the natural guardians of their children,
the right of family privacy and family autonomy.442 These links are
part of the interests protected by Roe and, therefore, only reinforce
the concept of viability. By imposing this balancing upon the vari-
ous interests, Bopp and Coleson are, in effect, agreeing that such a
balancing should occur.443 That is exactly the point of Roe. It is by
allowing this balancing to shift as the interests of the mother, the
fetus, and the state vary, that national guidelines are provided
with flexibility for case-by-case interpretation.
Bopp and Coleson cite a series of cases allowing various inva-
sive procedures on the mother to ensure fetal health.444 In all these
cases, however, the fetus was viable at the point of state interven-
tion.445 This recognition of the state's interest in protecting poten-
tial life is consistent with Roe and demonstrates the compatability
of the abortion cases and these cases. The one case that Bopp and
Coleson cite as supporting state previability intervention, Taft v.
Taft, was reversed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
upon a finding that "[n]o case has been cited to us, nor have we
found one, in which a court ordered a pregnant woman to submit
to a surgical procedure in order to assist in carrying a child not
then viable to term. ' 446 Thus, even though courts may be willing to
balance the fetus' needs for medical care agairnst the woman's right
to reject that care, such balancing has occurred only in cases in-
volving viable fetuses. 441 This result is completely consistent with
Roe's viability framework.
D. Criminal Law
The last area of the law that should be considered in light of
Roe's framework involves criminal punishment for injury to or
death of a fetus. Bopp and Coleson imply that fetuses at any stage
442. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 262.
443. Bopp and Coleson admit that such a balancing should take place when they state
that "[w]hile women's rights must be placed in the balance, it is certainly equitable that
unborn fetuses be allowed to develop without preventable handicaps and injuries." Id. at
266 (footnote omitted).
444. See id. at 263-65 (citations omitted).
445. See id.
446. Id. at 265 (citing Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 334 n.4, 446 N.E.2d 395, 397 n.4
(1983)).
447. See id. at 263-265.
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of development are owed protection under the criminal law.448 The
cases on which they rely, however, distinguish among stages of fe-
tal development and favor protection based on birth or viability.
Bopp and Coleson contend that the distinction between birth
and viability is arbitrary because it is illogical not to punish one
who kills an "unborn" fetus and to punish one who kills a "born
alive" fetus.449 In their article,4 5° Bopp and Coleson maintain that
"the only satisfactory way to make the law logically consistent is to
give the unborn protection in all contexts. '45 1 They fail to show,
however, in what ways the viability criterion does not work or why
the punishment for harm to the fetus should not attach at
viability.
In Keeler v. Superior Court,5 2 for example, the California Su-
preme Court held that a viable fetus was not a "person" at the
time that an injury resulting in its being stillborn occurred. This
distinction between "person" and fetus for the purposes of a homi-
cide statute was subsequently rejected by the California Legisla-
ture, which later amended the homicide statute to make it unlaw-
ful to "kill a human being or a fetus. '453 Another California
decision, People v. Smith,45 4 rejected the Legislature's amendment
when it was applied to a nonviable fetus. Upholding the Roe
framework, the California Court of Appeals held that only after
viability could the destruction of a fetus "constitute murder or
other form of homicide. 455
Bopp and Coleson find this result "[a]mazing. ' '45" They argue
that the treatment of the unborn should be consistent in all legal
contexts. The result in People v. Smith, however, is not unwar-
ranted. In fact, the more logical approach is to retain the national
standard that has resulted from Roe and to provide for legal recog-
nition and protection of the fetus only after viability. In addition,
if Bopp and Coleson's requirement for consistency is eliminated, it
would seem logical to allow the state to protect nonviable fetuses
448. See id. at 268-81.
449. See id. at 281.
450. See id. at 268-76 (citing Keeler v. Superior Ct., 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87
Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970)(en banc); People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 755, 129 Cal. Rptr.
498, 502 (1976)).
451. Id. at 269.
452. 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970)(en banc).
453. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988).
454. 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976).
455. Id. at 755, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
456. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 269.
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that are victims of homicide when their mothers have chosen to
carry them to term. This would resolve Bopp and Coleson's con-
cern for "protecting a woman's fundamental right of choosing to
carry her child to term. ' 457 It would also protect the woman's right
to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy without facing pos-
sible homicide charges.
Bopp and Coleson also argue in favor of overturning the "born
alive" rule.458 This is commendable, because it would be consistent
with Roe in establishing that punishment under the criminal law,
as in tort and wrongful death, should attach upon a determination
of viability. Bopp and Coleson also would allow the states to pro-
tect fetuses throughout a woman's pregnancy. But that approach
has been rejected consistently in a variety of legal contexts, includ-
ing the criminal law. If consistency is the goal that is desired, via-
bility is the approach that will allow consistent recognition of both
the woman's rights and the state's interests. 459
E. Respect
Bopp and Coleson argue that respect for fetuses has been rec-
ognized in contexts outside of abortion law in the form of "recogni-
tion of the dignity of human life."'460 They see this respect demon-
strated by statutes that require humane disposal of fetal remains
and that proscribe fetal experimentation. 46' They conclude that
Roe is inconsistent with these statutes and that "despite the dic-
tates of Roe, the people through their elected representatives con-
tinue to express their belief in the essential humanity of the
unborn."4 62
Their view of Roe as out-of-step with recognizing the dignity
of human life is inaccurate. Roe's dictates are not contrary to hu-
457. Id. at 270 (footnote omitted). It is interesting to note that Bopp and Coleson's
apparent concern with protecting a "woman's fundamental right" to choose to carry her
child to term runs contrary to their statement that "[n]o privacy interests [are] involved on
the part of the woman." Id.
458. See id. at 272.
459. In the tort law context, a valuable justification remains for retaining the "born
alive" rule to allow recovery by a child who is injured in utero and then born. Recognizing
this validity, however, does not undermine the use of the viability standard in other con-
texts. It is logical to require that the fetus be born before its tort claim arises. On the other
hand, if the injury were the result of a wrongful act, the state should be able to bring crimi-
nal charges against the "bad actor" only if the fetus were viable when injured.
460. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 281.
461. See id. at 281-82.
462. Id. at 282.
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manity. In fact, Roe recognized this dignity by acknowledging the
state's interests in protecting potential human life once the fetus
reaches viability.463 It is Bopp and Coleson who are out-of-step in
their refusal to recognize the woman's concomitant dignity that the
Court protected in Roe.
Bopp and Coleson are mistaken in arguing that Roe and its
progeny are inconsistent with the treatment of the fetus in other
areas of the law. Recognition in other legal contexts requires either
that the fetus be born alive, thus becoming a "person" under the
fourteenth amendment, or that the fetus be viable at the time of
injury or death to receive protection. This is the same standard
found in Roe. It permits states to protect viable fetuses by regulat-
ing abortions after viability. In an attempt to show the inapplica-
bility of Roe, Bopp and Coleson have actually demonstrated the
need for an effective, consistent and provable standard. Roe's via-
bility test is such a standard.
V. CONCLUSION
Bopp and Coleson view Roe v. Wade as "anomalous, absolute,
and ripe for reversal. ' 464 Roe, however, reached a meaningful bal-
ance between the important competing interests that all deserve
constitutional recognition. The decision recognized that a woman's
liberty and privacy interests are at stake in the choice whether to
have an abortion or to bear a child. Roe also recognized the state's
interests in protecting maternal health and potential human life.
Supporters on both sides of the abortion discussion point out
ways in which Roe should be altered to give their view more pro-
tection, either by declaring that the woman's choice is absolute
throughout her pregnancy, or by declaring that the state's interests
are compelling throughout the woman's pregnancy. Neither of
these alternatives, however, correctly acknowledges the delicate
balance that is necessary under our constitutional scheme. Roe cor-
rectly acknowledged that balance and it would be devastating to
both sides to lose its mediating effect.
Bopp and Coleson's call for Roe's reversal refuses to consider
the woman's interests. Once the woman is factored back into the
discussion, the need for the compromise that Roe represents be-
comes clear.
463. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-165 (1973).
464. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 2, at 181.
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